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Conviction According to Conscience;
The Medieval Jurists' Debate Concerning
Judicial Discretion and the Law of Proof
RICHARD M. FRAHER
One bright, sunny day in northern Italy, let us say in Bologna in the
year 1275, a group of law students might have sat and listened to this
case. A man named Seius slipped into a shed owned by his sworn
enemy, Titius. A priest, a wealthy merchant, and a physician, all of
them unimpeachable witnesses, saw Seius enter the shed with his sword
drawn. A moment later they heard a man cry out. Then they clearly
saw Seius, shaken and pallid, emerge through the doorway, bloody
sword in hand. When Seius noticed the witnesses coming toward him,
he fled. The witnesses found Titius in the shed, unconscious, dying
from a sword wound. Upon investigation, the podestt), the magistrate
charged with criminal investigations, discovered that Seius had recently
sworn that he would kill Titius, and further, that everyone in town
believed that he was guilty. The podesta ordered his arrest and, after a
manhunt, Seius was captured before he could slip across the border to
the neighboring city-state.
If a similar case had occurred in twentieth-century America, the rest
of the story would be simple to tell. Seius would be charged with
murdering Titius. The prosecutor would use circumstantial evidence
to establish that Seius had the motive, the means, and the opportunity
to kill Titius, and that nobody else could have done it. Even with no
eyewitnesses, we would not find it remarkable if a jury found Seius
guilty. To the modem western mind, proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is readily seen as the product of inferences drawn from circumstantial
evidence.But in thirteenth-century Europe, it is not so clear that Seius could
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have been convicted. In fact, the crime committed without eyewitnesses
was the paradigmatic "hard case" in thirteenth-century criminal pro-
cedure: no matter how obvious the circumstantial evidence, a defendant
was not supposed to be convicted without proof "as clear as the light
of day." Traditionally, this meant proof by the testimony of two
unimpeachable eyewitnesses.
In the "good old days" prior to the Church's abolition of proof by
ordeal, any doubts about the case against Seius could have been resolved
by invoking divine judgment through an ordeal by hot iron or water.2
But the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 banned ordeals, creating a
problem for anyone who wanted to see suspects such as Seius punished,3
for the law of proof as taught in the faculties of civil and canon law
was demanding and unyielding. Under its rules, only two forms of
evidence could provide proof "as clear as the light of day": uncon-
tradicted testimony from two eyewitnesses, or confession by the ac-
cused.4 Moreover, the ius commune insisted that a judge adhere strictly
to the rules of law and acquit a suspect if the proof were imperfect:
"the judge must decide according to the allegations and the laws, not
according to his conscience." '5 These rules, protecting criminal defend-
ants from precipitous convictions, were justified by the statement that
"it is better to let the guilty go unpunished than to punish the innocent."'6
Given these strict standards of proof, the legal system faced three
alternatives when confronted with cases such as the murder of Titius.
One alternative would have been acquittal. But this solution would not
have produced a workable system of criminal law in any age, and it
clashed with the wellspring of thirteenth-century criminal jurisprudence:
"it is a matter of public interest that crimes not go unpunished" 7 A
second alternative would have permitted the judges to use torture to
induce a confession. Indeed, one legal historian has suggested that the
creation of a law of torture was precisely the scholastic jurists' response
to the abolition of the ordeal,8 but this article will demonstrate that
torture could not have been the whole story of how thirteenth-century
Europe responded to the abolition of ordeals. There was a third
alternative open to the medieval lawyers, and this was to develop more
flexible rules of proof than the unworkable laws preserved in the learned
tomes of Roman and canon law.
Experimentation with legal innovation came hard to a profoundly
conservative profession, but medieval jurists were capable of adaptation.
In this instance, their task was to articulate a standard of proof that
would respect deeply seated notions of due process of law, while allowing
the inquisitorial judge enough discretion to convict Seius, the obviously
guilty defendant.
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Thirteenth-Century Procedural Treatises:
The Key to the Puzzle
The thirteenth century was a watershed in the history of European
criminal law. The pontificate of Innocent III (1198-1215) featured two
innovations that reshaped criminal procedure throughout Christendom:
the abandonment of trial by ordeal9 and the adoption of inquisitorial
procedures.' 0 The ban on judicial ordeals committed the scholastic
jurists and the courts, both ecclesiastical and secular, to reworking the
law of proof." The adoption of ex officio inquisitorial procedures,
alongside or in place of the traditional accusatorial process, shifted the
initiative from private plaintiffs to public magistrates, permitting both
the Church and the secular states to launch public campaigns against
crime. 2 These sweeping changes in criminal procedure and in the
administration of justice were matched by a massive outpouring of
scholastic commentary on criminal law and procedure.
Ironically, despite the fundamental importance of thirteenth-century
developments, the 1200s have attracted comparatively little attention
in the current wave of scholarship in criminal justice history.' 3 Surviving
archival records concerning the operation of criminal courts are sparse
for the thirteenth-century, so there is an insufficient basis for statistical
studies, even small-scale ones aimed at outlining the social history of
crime prior to 1300." In addition, the lush profusion of thirteenth-
century scholastic jurisprudence concerning crime and criminal pro-
cedure remains only marginally accessible.
It is relatively easy for an historian to consult the great milestones
of thirteenth-century proceduralist writing, and thus reconstruct the
broad outline of the era's criminal law and procedure.'5 Tancred's Ordo
iudiciarius, composed between about 1209 and 1215,16 is a compre-
hensive picture of canonical procedure early in the 1200s and is available
in an excellent modern edition.'7 The classic proceduralist handbook,
which remained in use from the 1270s until the early modern era, was
William Durantis's Speculum iudiciale.8 Originally published around
1270 and subsequently revised by the author, the Speculum received
updates with commentaries by the great canonist Joannes Andreae and
the eminent jurist Baldus de Ubaldis (+1400)." It was a favorite of
publishing houses in the early decades of print and is available in a
modern reprint.2" Finally, there is Albertus Gandinus's Tractatus de
maleficiis (Treatise on Crimes), which went through multiple versions
before the author completed his last revisions at Siena in 1299.
Gandinus's work, like the Speculum iudiciale, attained instant celebrity
and remained influential into the modern era, when it was displaced
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by sixteenth-century authors. The Treatise on Crimes is available in a
first-rate modern edition by Herman Kantorowicz.2"
But the relative accessibility of Durantis and Gandinus creates an
almost overwhelming temptation for the scholar to read the Speculum
iudiciale and the Tractatus de maleficiis as the final word on thirteenth-
century criminal jurisprudence. The cost of relying exclusively on
Durantis and Gandinus is that we ignore the intellectual ferment, the
academic debates, the confrontation of conflicting opinions and values
that lie beneath the surface of the two works. Neither Durantis nor
Gandinus pretended to be an original scholar. They both borrowed
juristic bits and pieces from their predecessors, smoothing over many
of the conflicts among their sources.
Durantis had taught canon law at Modena and perhaps Bologna,
but composed the Speculum iudiciale while he served as an appellate
judge in the papal courts at Rome. He clearly intended the work to
serve as a comprehensive handbook for judges and practitioners rather
than as a piece of scholarly creativity or disputation.22 There was
nothing original in the Speculum iudiciale, nor was there supposed to
be: Durantis simply digested the proceduralist lore of his predecessors
and contemporaries, "down to the last comma "'23 The same is true of
the Tractatus de maleficiis, despite Kantorowicz's dogged insistence
that Gandinus composed the first European treatise on criminal law.24
In reality, treatises on criminal law appeared as early as Tancred's
Summula de criminibus, dated about 1209, and the surviving manu-
scripts of the text that Kantorowicz regarded as the first recension of
the Tractatus de maleficiis suggest that Gandinus's work consists of an
expansion upon an earlier and much shorter treatise by a Bolognese
professor of civil law.2"
Much suggests that Gandinus, like Durantis, simply created a digest
of the current criminal law, basing it on pre-existing treatises on crimes,
judicial torture, public fame, and a huge number of so-called quaestiones
disputatae. These "disputed questions" were routine academic exercises,
in which the Bolognese professors argued fine points of legal theory or
its practical application. Gandinus, who was never a law professor,
availed himself of the written accounts of these juristic disputes,
sometimes citing his sources by name and sometimes not.26 Like any
practical handbook, however, and unlike classroom reports of quaes-
tiones, the Tractatus de maleficiis recited these questions to provide
the reader with the correct answer, not merely to acquaint him with
all the dissenting opinions of the academics.
The synthetic works of Durantis and Gandinus present a misleading
image of neatly fitted bits and pieces pulled together from disparate
Conviction According to Conscience
but harmonious sources. Hence, our reliance on Durantis and Gan-
dinus, and our hesitancy to plunge into the confused mass of manu-
scripts and lesser printed works that recorded the day-to-day disputes
of the Bolognese masters deprive us of the divergent and contradicting
theories that were debated by mainstream juristic opinion amid the
rapid development of criminal law and procedure in the thirteenth
century. A glimpse behind Durantis and Gandinus can tell us not only
what the competing alternatives were, but, in some cases, why the
scholarly consensus swung one way or the other.
The law of proof is a particularly interesting subject for this kind of
enquiry, because the period that lies between the abandonment of proof
by ordeal in 1215 and the publication of the Speculum iudiciale around
1270 was a time of major adjustment. The standard account is that
the Church's ban on ordeals led the courts to adopt an alternative law
of proof from the learned legal traditions as expressed in the Speculum
iudiciale. But the rule governing proof in criminal cases was almost
impossibly stringent: a criminal defendant could not be convicted
without direct testimony from two eyewitnesses or a confession.
According to present-day opinion, the ius commune's standard for
proof was adopted precisely because its stringency precluded any exercise
of human discretion. John Langbein has argued that it was impossible
for thirteenth-century people to accept human judgment in place of
divine. Hence, the "overwhelming emphasis [in the law of proof] is
upon the elimination of judicial discretion."27 The Speculum iudiciale
and all of the subsequent proceduralist literature suggests that medieval
jurists were concerned about restraining discretion, but that the decision
to do so was not easy. There was spirited debate, some jurists arguing
for greater discretion as a means of promoting efficient punishment,
others insisting upon strict adherence to the two-witness rule, and while
the more traditional jurists might have gained the upper hand in the
law schools, the efficiency-oriented reformers influenced the shape of
Italian criminal statutes during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
That the debate took place at all challenges the assumption that people
in medieval Europe were so steeped in traditional, magico-religious
views of the world that they could not accept human judgment in
criminal cases.
This article examines the works and ideas of a relatively unknown
Bolognese professor of Roman law, Thomas de Piperata, whose Trac-
tatus de fama was one among the many obscure thirteenth-century
writings used by Albertus Gandinus. Few details are known about
Thomas's life and work except for this treatise, but a close reading of
the Tractatus makes it clear that it contains a theory of proof that
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departed from the ius commune's rule that required the testimony of
two eyewitnesses or confession for conviction. Instead, Thomas pro-
posed two alternate theories under which a magistrate could convict a
defendant without the "full" or "legitimate" proof required in civil
and canon law. First, there was statutory discretion (arbitrium), which
empowered an urban magistrate to convict on the basis of proof that
would have been insufficient under the ius commune. Second, even
under Roman law, if the circumstantial evidence proved a defendant's
guilt to a certainty, the judge could convict on the basis of the
"undoubted indicia."
Thomas's treatise is not the only evidence of a long-lived scholastic
debate concerning discretion and proof in the criminal process. The
works of Albertus Gandinus, of the canonists William Durantis, Joannes
Andreae, and Hostiensis, of the great civilian Bartolus, and of the
fifteenth-century criminalist, Angelus Aretinus express a persistent,
lively debate. These works, and Thomas de Piperata's quaestiones
disputatae prove that the social and political context of the medieval
Italian city-state encouraged the jurists to rely upon human judgment
to resolve difficult cases.
Thomas's willingness to circumvent the strictness of the learned law
of proof suggests that historians have long misunderstood medieval
attitudes toward human discretion in the criminal process. The scho-
lastic jurists articulated a stringent law of proof that restricted judicial
discretion because they perceived palpable incentives for judges to
abuse discretion in a criminal justice system that included few means
of restraint. It is true that many jurists ultimately rejected Thomas de
Piperata's theory that the ius commune permitted a judge to convict
on the basis of circumstantial evidence, but they did so out of respect
for the rule of law and not out of some irrational belief in human
incapacity. In statutory law, where the jurists felt free to depart from
the strictures of Roman law and the sacred canons of the early Church,
scholastic jurisprudence recognized that magistrates routinely exercised
broad discretionary power over the criminal process. Although main-
stream jurists were disturbed at the erosion of due process, they agreed
that the magistrate's statutory arbitrium extended to convicting de-
fendants on the basis of evidence that was not full or legitimate proof
in the ius commune.
We need to reformulate our notion of the shift in the law of proof
that resulted from the abolition of ordeals in 1215. The decrees of the
Fourth Lateran Council did not precipitate a psychological crisis that
led thirteenth-century jurists to concoct an impossible standard of proof
as a prophylactic against the exercise of human judgment.28 The
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difficulties of the two-witness rule were known at least a half-century
before 1215, when some twelfth-century canonists tried to circumvent
it to secure convictions without resorting to ordeal.29 Using torture was
one way to conform with the law of proof while producing a high rate
of convictions; but every jurist knew that torture represented a dan-
gerous investigative device, one that produced confessions regardless
of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This reversed the traditional
principle that "it is better to spare the guilty than to condemn the
innocent."3 Thus, when the abolition of ordeals forced the courts and
the jurists to fall back upon the Roman standard of proof, canonists,
civil jurists, and communal legislators alike responded by trying to give
the magistrate more latitude, not less. The canonists invented a whole
new category of procedure based upon the notoriety of a crime, which
was proved "by the very evidence of the thing "'3' A minority of civil
jurists followed Thomas de Piperata's suggestion that a full proof could
arise out of overwhelming circumstantial evidence, and many Italian
statutes granted magistrates broad power to punish defendants without
the full proof of Roman law.
Yet, there remained a dilemma that medieval jurists were unable to
resolve. In an age that did not see individual rights as a pervasive check
upon the powers of the state, the fairness of the legal process was
guaranteed primarily by the "solemnities of the law.'32 These "solem-
nities" consisted of time-honored principles that ostensibly guaranteed
that the legal process would be an even playing field, declining "neither
to the left nor to the right."33 But every concession that increased the
inquisitorial judge's discretion to prosecute crimes constituted an ero-
sion of the rules of due process. If the jurists stubbornly defended the
traditional rule of proof, and if many of them begrudged every marginal
concession made in the interest of efficient prosecution and punishment,
they did so out of reverence for the ancient solemnities of the law and
awareness of the deeper values at stake-not out of abject fear of
human judgment.
Thomas de Piperata: The Career of a Minor
Thirteenth-Century Jurist
The details of Thomas de Piperata's life and career were quickly
forgotten, even within the university at Bologna, where local lore about
individual professors seems to have been handed down from master
to student along with the curricular materials.34 Within a century of
Thomas's death, the great Bartolus of Saxoferrato quoted at length and
Law and History Review
with approval from Thomas's Tractatus de fama but referred to the
author as "a certain Thomas de Piperata;' suggesting that Thomas's
fame had already faded.35 By the sixteenth century, the antiquarian
Diplovatatius, who preserved a large part of the medieval tradition
concerning the Bolognese doctors of law, knew only that Thomas de
Piperata had taught contemporaneously with Rolandinus de Romanciis
sometime between 1256 and 1.288.36 In contrast, while the memory of
Thomas faded away, his most significant scholarly work, the Tractatus
de fama, circulated widely in manuscript, and remained at the center
of a lively juristic debate concerning the problem of proof in criminal
cases.3" The explanation for this anomaly lies in a series of political
events that abruptly terminated Thomas's academic career.
Unlike many of his more illustrious colleagues on the faculty of law,
Thomas de Piperata was a native Bolognese. Foreign-born scholars,
along with the entire corporate entity of the university, could decamp
from Bologna during periods of war, pestilence, town-gown violence,
or political strife.3" For Thomas and the other native-born Bolognese
professors, however, war and political strife were inescapable.
Bologna's leading families, like those of many thirteenth-century
Italian communes, divided themselves into hostile factions vaguely
affiliated with the Guelph and Ghibelline parties of the conflict between
Pope and emperor.39 This meant that even in the course of ordinary
public business, the threat of civil discord ran just below the surface.
In 1269, Thomas de Piperata and three other doctors of law gave
expert opinions on a contract between Bologna and a Florentine coin-
maker named Bitto de Tornaquincis.4 ° The contract (for minting
Bolognese money) specifically indemnified Bitto against any losses that
might result from political strife in Bologna." Thomas's entire adult
life bore the imprint of the rivalry between Guelphs, led by the pre-
eminent Geremei, and Ghibellines, led by the equally eminent Lam-
bertazzi. Thomas's family, a politically powerful clan named Storlicti,
had historically aligned itself with the Ghibellines. Thomas reaffirmed
the existing arrangement of family status and loyalty when he married
Bartolomea Lambertazzi in 1271 42
During his career as a jurist, Thomas was publicly identified with
the Lambertazzi and their political fortunes. He first appeared as a
professor of civil law in the Bolognese archives for the year 1265,"3
and at least one Bolognese chronicler would place Thomas's first steps
toward public prominence after an outburst of civil strife in 1264,
which was sparked by an illicit affair between Bonifacius Geremei and
Imelda Lambertazzi."
Whether or not there is any historical truth to this Romeo and Juliet
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tale, the animosity between Bolognese Guelphs and Ghibellines was
fueled by the commune's policy of allying Bologna with Guelph city-
states and cooperating with Guelph factions in exile from Ghibelline-
controlled communes such as Modena." Thomas was drawn directly
into the fray in 1272, when Bolognese foreign policy faced conflicting
loyalties. The Guelphs, led by the Geremei, demanded that Bologna
go to war against the Ghibelline faction that had seized the commune
of Forli, rebelling against Bolognese sovereignty. The Ghibellines, led
by the Lambertazzi, insisted that the commune should go to war against
Modena, which had violated the terms of its alliance with Bologna by
providing sanctuary to the Guelphs who had been expelled during the
coup at Forli. The Geremei held the greater political power, but the
Lambertazzi raised a legal objection, questioning the limits of the
government's constitutional power to use force against subject states
that broke their oaths." Bologna's communal magistrates consulted
four professors of law: Albertus Odofredus and Rolandinus de Ro-
manciis from the Geremei group, and Thomas de Piperata and Bon-
romaeus Duliolus from the Lambertazzi faction. 7 The jurists provided
a plethora of legal arguments but no resolution: a clear legal decision
would not have resolved the political impasse.
In 1273, the Guelph faction led Bologna to war with Forli despite
the unresolved objections of the Ghibellines. The Lambertazzi faced
the unpalatable choice of rendering cavalry service themselves, or of
paying substitutes to fight against their political compatriots," for
failure to support one's commune in war was treason. To complicate
an already vexed situation, the initial Bolognese campaign did not
subdue the Ghibellines who controlled Forli, making the war more
protracted and expensive than either faction had anticipated. Exasper-
ated, the Lambertazzi and their supporters took up arms against the
Geremei, and a bloody, full-scale civil war broke out in 1274. 4' After
an interlude of violence and chaos, the Geremei regained control, and
the Lambertazzi faction went into exile.
Thomas had acted in accord with his public loyalties. The Bolognese
criminal archives record that he and his brother were charged with
treason and exiled, the commune appropriating their goods." One can
perhaps find a trace of Thomas's expertise in a testamentary device
concocted to protect his family's fortune from the disaster. When
Thomas's father died in August of 1274, on the eve of civil war, the
old man disinherited his sons and named his minor grandsons as his
heirs.' The grandsons escaped the purge of 1275, so the family's real
property remained intact during the factional strife, which ended in
1285. Thomas did not. He died in exile, in 1282, his personal goods
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still held by the state, his name still listed among those condemned for
treason, his academic career terminated by a reversal of political fortune,
as capricious and devastating to a thirteenth-century jurist as it would
be two centuries later to Machiavelli's prince.
The Tractatus de fama
Given the brevity of Thomas's career, it is not surprising that he
seems to have produced only a handful of juristic works. The Bolognese
records suggest that he wrote at least a small number of consilia, legal
opinions, which have not been found.2 Upwards of a dozen of Thomas's
quaestiones disputatae were handed down in the so-called "Great
Books" of questions debated by the civil jurists,53 but these disputed
questions need not concern us here, except insofar as they prove that
Thomas's legal interests centered on criminal law and testamentary
devices. 4 There is also a hint in the manuscript tradition that Thomas
might have written three brief treatises on crimes, procedural exceptions,
and torture," but the weight of the evidence suggests that Thomas de
Piperata wrote only one treatise, the Tractatus de fama.
Given that the Bolognese law professors, both civilian and canonist,
are known to have suppressed the memory of colleagues who strayed
from the consensus on legal doctrine or intra-faculty relations,56 it is
not too wild to suggest that Thomas de Piperata, the unrepentant exile,
was proscribed unofficially by the jurists. His Tractatus defama enjoyed
some reputation, and his quaestiones disputatae circulated in the
standard collections, but Thomas received no mention in the civilian
glosses to the Digest's texts on fama and only one jurist approvingly
cited him by name. Others borrowed Thomas's ideas, but always
without identifying the source. He was a man with whom it was safe,
and perhaps fashionable, to disagree. 7
Nevertheless, the treatise on fama attracted a great deal of attention
from Thomas's contemporaries and succeeding generations of scholastic
jurists. Much of it was digested in Gandinus's Tractatus de maleficiis,
though Gandinus mentioned Thomas by name only once, and that in
disagreement.5" In the 1340s, while composing the Additiones to Dur-
antis's Speculum iudiciale, Joannes Andreae borrowed from Thomas's
treatise in his discussion of notorious crimes.59 The legendary Bartolus,
in his commentary on the Digest, claimed to have relied exclusively
on Thomas's treatise to explain the significance of fama.6° Thomas's
work was still influential at Bologna in the fifteenth century, even
though its attribution had become confused: Angelus Aretinus used
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Thomas's treatise, or a work derived directly from it, as a source for
his Tractatus de maleficiis but claimed that he was quoting Bartolus.6"
Finally, with the advent of printing, the Tractatus defama became one
of the staples of printed collections of criminal law.62
The reason for the widespread circulation of the Tractatus de fama
is not obvious from the text. Thomas offered only the most oblique
claim concerning the relevance of his work, stating that he was writing
the piece at the instance of another jurist, William of Cunh,63 "because
many uncertainties arise in the courts concerning fama, indicia, ar-
guments, and presumptions."64 Although Thomas devoted the majority
of his attention to defining fama and exploring its effects, the theme
that ties the discussion of fama together with the analysis of indicia,
arguments, and presumptions is the question of sufficiency of proof.
Thomas, a professor of civil law, would not have admitted that his
topic's relevance originated in canon law and contemporary inquisitorial
practice rather than classical Roman law. In actuality, even though
classical Roman law had devoted considerable attention to fama as a
determinant of an individual's legal status, the thirteenth-century
relevance offama derived from the new criminal procedures instituted
by the Church under Pope Innocent III.65 The inquisitorial process
instituted by the Fourth Lateran Council permitted a magistrate to
proceed ex officio, without any accusation being lodged, whenever
public fama indicated that somebody had committed a crime.66
The canonists did not inventfama; they borrowed it from the Roman
tradition where it had played a minor role in the law of proof. But by
making fama the procedural threshold that had to be surmounted
before the inquisitorial magistrate could institute criminal proceedings,
Innocent madefama analogous to the common law theory of probable
cause. Thoughfama played no significant part in twelfth-century debate,
thirteenth-century canonistic literature is full of discussions of fama
and its procedural significance. 67 The two central issues were how to
establish the existence of fama, so that the judge would know when to
proceed, and how far the judge could proceed on the basis of fama.
Thomas seems to have been the first civil jurist to devote himself to
a detailed analysis of fama as a quantum of proof, and, unlike the
canonists, Thomas did not bury his analysis in the marginal glosses to
the authoritative corpus of law.68 He decided to compose a separate
treatise that could circulate independently.
But despite this new literary genre, the content held nothing new
about fama. Thomas defined fama as "something that the people of
any city, town, camp, village, or district commonly believe, asserting
it in words or speech, but that they do not hold as certain and true or
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manifest."69 He then proceeded, in good scholastic form, to define the
terms of the definition. "The people" of any city meant the majority
of the populace, rather than "all the people'" Unanimity of belief was
not essential.7" Next, Thomas turned to the relationship between the
fact that fama alleged to be true and the population whose opinion
was being consulted. One could not conduct a poll in the parish of St.
Proculo at Bologna to establish the public fama that Lord Brancallo
and Lord Castelleno had once been senators of Rome.7 On the other
hand, the majority belief of one parish in Bologna would be enough
to establishfama if the question concerned the identity of the magistrates
of certain villages in the Bolognese city-state. 2 Fama concerning major
facts, such as rumors of civil war, required geographically widespread
belief, while minor facts, such as an offense committed by some lower
class citizen, could be established by fama arising in a small locale.73
Like the canonists before him, Thomas argued that fama arose only
from people who had reason to know what they were talking about.74
After a misguided attempt to show off his learning by explaining the
etymological origins of the word fama,75 Thomas reached the heart of
his discussion. If fama was important as a procedural threshold in the
criminal process, then the key issue was how to establish that fama
existed. To this question, Thomas provided two possible answers. The
existence offama, he asserted, could be proved either by the testimony
of two witnesses or by the judge's knowledge that its existence was
"notorious' 76 Proof by two witnesses was the traditional Roman law
standard for proof. The notion of a fact "proving itself" by its very
notoriety, so that a judge could proceed as an inquisitor on the basis
of his own knowledge, was a recent canonistic invention.77
Proving the existence of fama by eyewitness testimony was tricky,
according to Thomas, because of the hearsay problem. The ius com-
mune, like modern common law, limited a witness to testifying about
events that he had perceived directly. Testimony based on the statements
of other people had no evidentiary value. If the court asked the witness,
"How do you know that there is fama about this matter?" and the
witness responded that he heard it from other people, the testimony
was not probative.78 Hence, it was preferable for the court's clerk not
to ask how the witness knew. Instead, a careful clerk would prompt
the witness to say that the greater part of the populace believed such
and such to be true, but that the witness had no idea about the origin
of the belief.79 In order to avoid hearsay, Thomas preferred to attribute
fama to the facts themselves, rather than the person who initiated
public discussion about the facts.80 The structure of Thomas's argument
may be alien to the modem reader, but modem laws of evidence have
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not articulated a clear principle governing information that "everybody
knows."' Further, Thomas's artful advice on coaching witnesses to
avoid the technicalities of evidentiary law possesses a modern ring.
Finally, in his last and most interesting analysis, Thomas asked what
was the effect of fama once it had been proved. The answer depended
upon the procedural context in which fama was being offered. Fama
alone could resolve certain questions of law; it could not resolve a
disputed factual question.8 2 In some situations, especially in civil
litigation, fama could validate a prior legal transaction that had been
subsequently challenged on the basis of facts that had been unknown
to one or more of the participants at the time of the transaction. In
such cases, fama could determine the outcome of litigation. 3 Fama
played a less decisive role if one of the parties argued that people
believed the alleged claim to be true.
Thomas provided a series of illustrations to explain the distinction.
The first case involved a contract signed by two parties, both reputed
to be competent to enter a binding agreement. If one of the parties,
despite appearances, turned out to have been a filiusfamilias, a legal
dependent under his father's power, the contract was subject to chal-
lenge. If the creditor sued for repayment, the young man could offer
an exception, a legal defense, based on his incompetence to contract
without his father's consent. But if the creditor proved that at the time
of the contract's formation there had been fama that the young man
was legally independent, the contract was enforceable."4 The same
analysis applied if somebody had prevailed in a civil suit against a
defendant who subsequently turned out to have been a filiusfamilias.
Such a person would normally lack standing to sue or to be sued
without his father's consent and hence would be able to overturn an
adverse judgment. But if it had been handed down in the belief that
he was legally competent, then his attempt to quash the judgment
would be prevented by the fama of his competence.85 Similarly, in any
legal proceeding in which the judge, arbiter, or witnesses had to be
free, not servile, that one of the players was discovered to be a slave
did not invalidate the prior proceeding, so long as fama had existed
that the participant was a free man. 6 In all of these cases, fama operated
to validate the legal effect that people had been trying to create.87 Fama
operated as an after-the-fact fix for legal transactions that had been
formally flawed and hence protected the legitimate expectations of the
parties.
A more difficult situation arose when one party wanted to use fama
to establish the substance of a disputed claim of fact, instead of using
it to overcome a technical flaw in an otherwise valid cause of action.
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For example, what if a plaintiff sued for specific enforcement of a
promise to convey goods, or for enforcement of a contract of sale, and
proved that there was fama that the defendant had made the alleged
promise?"8 Thomas was unequivocal in responding that substantive
matters in litigation had to be proved by witnesses testifying about
their own direct knowledge.8 9 Thomas insisted that fama by itself
contributed nothing to a party's factual assertion,90 but where fama
was added to the testimony of eyewitnesses, then fama had the effect
of confirming what the witnesses said.9 ' This was not legally significant
in cases where the plaintiff's case was proved by the testimony of two
unimpeachable eyewitnesses, butfama could have a confirmatory effect
when they were not.
In the real world, witnesses were almost invariably impeachable, and
many witnesses who were nominally incompetent to testify were given
a hearing, although the probative value of their testimony was probably
discounted.92 Thus the judge, who was obliged to find the truth in any
way that he could, might rely upon fama to tip the scales in favor of
believing the witnesses. According to Thomas, using fama to confirm
an otherwise flawed proof was analogous to two other common devices:
bringing in a huge number of witnesses, all of whom might be
exceptionable but whose sheer numbers added to their credibility,93 and
bringing in witnesses of high social stature, whose "dignity" might
compensate for their exceptionable qualities.94
In civil matters, therefore, fama created a presumption of validity
concerning any prior legal transaction whose formal correctness was
being challenged. In questions of fact, where fama existed with other
evidence or legal presumptions- such as, an individual who lived a
hundred years ago is now deceased95 -fama operated to overcome any
shortcomings in the evidence, permitting a court to rule in favor of a
plaintiff whose case was credible but formally imperfect.
Thomas took issue with Accursius's ordinary gloss to the Digest's
text on fama. According to the gloss, fama by itself confirmed the
naked assertion of a party to a suit.96 Accursius claimed that he was
following the opinion of Joannes, probably Joannes Bassianus.97 Other
jurists, according to Accursius, said that fama operated as proof when
it conformed with the workings of nature, as in the assertion that
Bulgarus was dead.9" Finally, a third group of jurists taught that fama
along with some other evidence operated as proof, so fama constituted
a half-proof.99 Thomas vehemently rejected the notion that Joannes
Bassianus had ever suggested that fama alone could prove a party's
assertion."°° He also rejected the idea thatfama amounted to half of a
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complete proof.""o But if Thomas intended to provoke heated discussion
about the role of fama in civil cases, he failed.
Fama's role in criminal procedure was a different matter, for here
Thomas managed to stir up a debate that raged on long after he died.
He began the discussion with a hypothetical case. What if a man were
accused of homicide, and the accuser could prove nothing except that
there was fama and a public outcry that the accused had committed
the crime. Could the accused be condemned on the basis of this kind
of proof?'02 The answer to this question was easy, because fama plus
a party's assertion was insufficient even in a civil case, much less in a
criminal case where the proof had to be "clearer than the light of
day."' 3 Therefore, fama, which was a sufficient basis for detaining a
suspect and initiating criminal proceedings against him, °4 fell far short
of the quantum of proof needed for conviction. The only effect of
fama as regards guilt or innocence was that it could validate the
testimony of witnesses whose character or testimony was not above
exception. 05
But there was an intermediate question. If fama was sufficient to
institute an inquisitorial process but insufficient to support a conviction,
was it sufficient for torture?' °6 To answer this, Thomas began from two
principles of Roman law. Torture could be used in a criminal matter,
but a magistrate could not begin to torture a suspect unless there were
indicia or arguments suggestive of the suspect's guilt. 107 Thomas based
his argument on the fact that while Roman law required multiple
indicia as a prerequisite to torture, fama constituted only a single
indicium 0 1 Thus, fama alone could not justify a magistrate's decision
to torture, butfama accompanied by any other indicium would suffice.
Other possible indicia included the testimony of a single witness, proven
animosity and threats between the suspect and the deceased, the
suspect's flight from the vicinity of the crime, or the defendant's
commission of a similar crime. °9
But all of this was according to Roman law or the ius commune. In
reality, torture was commonly governed by Italian municipal statutes
that varied from commune to commune. Bologna had enacted a
municipal law limiting the use of torture to specific criminal cases, and
even then requiring a higher threshold of proof before the podesta or
his judges could subject a suspect to torture."' Instead of mere indicia,
Bolognese law required the magistrate to establish "violent presump-
tions" before putting a defendant to the question. 1 Thomas defined
"violent presumptions" as "great indicia" less than complete proof but
greater than simple indicia."2 Not all Italian communes imposed any
restrictions on magistrates' power to use torture in criminal investi-
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gations. It was more typical for communes to grant their magistrates
extraordinary powers in criminal matters, under the rubric of full and
free discretion: plenum et liberum arbitrium."3
Thomas had carefully qualified his conclusions aboutfama in criminal
cases by arguing that they were "according to Roman law or ius
commune.'" 4 In contrast, if a podestb held statutory arbitrium, he was
free to use torture on the basis of a single indicium, and fama alone
would suffice. " 5 By granting its magistrate unfettered arbitrium, Thomas
argued that the municipality gave him the power to proceed as he saw
fit and as his conscience dictated." 6 This was a rejection of the deeply
felt Roman rule, "the judge must adjudicate according to the law and
the evidence alleged, and not according to his conscience."' 7 According
to Thomas, the statutory grant of arbitrium gave the podest&i or the
judge power that translated almost literally as "free rein."'' 8 This grant,
although it had the same name as the power held by a private arbitrator,
amounted to a much greater power than the "discretion of a good
man" to decide a single private dispute. Arbitrium was a grant of public
power, to be exercised according to the magistrate's best judgment," 9
and constrained by local customs rather than written law. 2 ° According
to Thomas, the only constraints upon a podestl who held arbitrium
under a municipal statute were that the judge had to have some
indicium that inclined him toward belief that the accused was guilty
before employing torture:'2 arbitrium gave a podesta power to omit
some of the solemnities of the law, but not all of them.'22 Neither could
a judge use his discretion to condemn a defendant solely on the basis
of his conscience, fama, or the testimony of a single witness.'23 But
arbitrium exempted the presiding judge from the traditional stringency
of the law of proof. If the case against a defendant fell short of a plena
probatio, Thomas concluded that the judge who possessed arbitrium
could still find the accused guilty, so long as the magistrate's conscience
and mind concurred with the evidence.' 24 If the judge acted with
criminal intent or gross negligence, he could be held liable for pro-
nouncing sentence.'25
Thomas underscored his emphatic departure from Roman law and
the ius commune by posing a hypothetical case. If a magistrate held
arbitrium, and a criminal case came before him in which the evidence
consisted of one unexceptionable witness's testimony plus fama and
public outcry, could the podestai find the defendant guilty? Not according
to Roman law, responded Thomas, but because the magistrate possessed
arbitrium, he could in good faith condemn the defendant. 26 Thomas
did not mean that this case was "fully proven" in the technical sense.'27
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Rather, official discretion authorized the magistrate to ignore the
formalities of the law of proof.
By liberating the magistrate from the stringencies of the two-witness
rule, however, Thomas created a further question. If the podestai with
arbitrium had the legal power to condemn a defendant whenever his
conscience and mind concurred with the evidence, what quantum of
evidence should be legally sufficient to convince the judge? Thomas
believed that the judge should be convinced beyond a doubt, the indicia
of guilt moving his mind toward belief that the accused had committed
the alleged crime.'28 Some indicia, taken together, were so powerful
that they left no room for doubt. Thomas called these "undoubted
indicia" and concluded that they provided sufficient legal basis for a
guilty verdict.'29
He went on to provide three hypothetical cases as examples, cases
which became more famous than their author.30 The first was the case
of a room with only one way in or out. A man is seen emerging from
the room. He is pale and grasps a bloody sword in his hands.
Immediately after his exit, a man slain by a sword is found in the
room. Although the crime without eyewitnesses was the bete noire of
Roman and canon law, Thomas said that the indicia in this case
established an "undoubted proof of the crime,"'' but he conceded that
the kinds of indicia contained in the first hypothetical were rare. 13 2
More common was the situation illustrated by a second case: "Titius
is killed in a vineyard, and Seius is accused of the crime. No witnesses
testify that they saw Seius kill Titius, but there is proof of the following:
Seius was Titius's enemy; Seius once threatened Titius with a sword;
Seius fled from the vicinity of the crime; and there is fama and public
outcry that Seius killed Titius."'33 Thomas conceded that no one of
these indicia, or even two of them, would suffice to prove the case
against Seius. But all four proved that Seius had committed the crime." '
The final case concerned an accusation that Seius had arranged the
killing of Titius. Once again, no witness testified to having seen or
heard the conspiracy. But there was proof that Seius was Titius's enemy;
that Seius was near the scene of the crime when Titius was killed; that
Seius sheltered the killer after the deed was done; that the killer was a
member of Seius's household; that Seius had sworn that he would have
Titius killed; and that in the past there had been bad blood between
Titius and Seius.' 5 Thomas's conclusion, once again, was that all of
the evidence taken together constituted "undoubted indicia" that Seius
had committed the crime. 36
Thus, Thomas de Piperata proposed two solutions to the paradigmatic
"hard case." One way to circumvent imperfect proof was to defer to
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the legislature's initiative. Statutory grants of arbitrium were a valid
means of lowering the standard of proof required in criminal cases.
Alternatively, one could interpret "proof as clear as the light of day"
as including not only witnesses and confession, but also circumstantial
proof beyond doubt.
The Juristic Debate about Discretion and Proof
in the Criminal Process
Albertus Gandinus
Thomas's ideas about proof triggered a dispute that lingered in the
lecture halls of Bologna into the fifteenth century. Albertus Gandinus,
who served a term as a judge in Bologna while Thomas was a professor
of civil law, was first to take up the argument. 37 The structure of
Gandinus's analysis is similar to Thomas's. In the Tractatus de fama,
Thomas began with fama and then moved through indicia, arguments,
and presumptions, covering the whole topic of proofs based upon
inferences from evidence other than eyewitness testimony. Gandinus
approached the problem of inferential approaches to proof in more or
less the same fashion. The larger structure of the Tractatus de maleficiis
was a discussion of each of the forms of criminal procedure: accusation,
denunciation, inquisition, exception, and summary procedure for no-
torious crimes.' 3 The last of these, the case of crimen notorium, raised
the issue of inferential proof.
The essence of procedure per notorium lay in establishing the
defendant's guilt, not by witnesses or confession, but by proving that
the alleged commission of the crime was so widely known that "the
truth could not be hidden by any tergiversation."' 39 Because procedure
per notorium raised the issue of the forms and the quantum of proof
required for conviction, Gandinus made the transition from the first
four forms of criminal procedure to the fifth form, notorium, with a
parenthetical discussion of circumstantial proof.4 ° Between procedure
by exception and procedure by notorium, Gandinus explained fama
and infamia, and the legal significance of rumor, secrecy, and manifest
facts. "' The conceptual glue that bound these topics together was the
question of what was proof in a criminal case, and what procedural
steps could result from which quantum of proof.
Although Gandinus's conceptual framework was similar to Thomas's,
Gandinus was far from slavish in following Thomas's lead. Gandinus's
lengthy discussion of fama ignored Thomas's ideas and began from
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the more traditional Roman law definition of fara as a measure of
status. 42 It took Gandinus several pages to get to the real issue, which
was how fama operated as proof in a criminal case. Gandinus joined
issue with Thomas under the rubric, "Concerning presumptions and
undoubted indicia from which conviction can follow." '43
Gandinus, like Thomas, believed that theoretically a judge could
condemn on the basis of "undoubted indicia.'4" Gandinus followed
Thomas's example by using hypotheticals, beginning with a case that
exemplified everyday experience.' 5 Titius is found slain or wounded
in a field or house. Nothing is known about the perpetrator, except
that a certain Seius is blamed for the crime, and the following items
have been proved against him by unexceptionable witnesses: first, that
there is a public outcry and fama, arising from worthy people, that
Seius committed the crime; second, that Seius was a serious enemy of
Titius; third, that Seius alone was seen leaving Titius's field or house,
fleeing with a drawn sword in his hand, and that immediately thereafter
Titius was found, slain or wounded, in the house or field. The question
that Gandinus posed was whether all of these indicia taken together
could be called undoubted indicia, on the basis of which sentence
could be pronounced.'46
There were four arguments in favor of condemning Seius on these
facts. First, these indicia had no less authority or probative weight than
witnesses or written documents, and a passage of Justinian's Code
equated proof by witnesses with proof by open and manifest indicia.'4 7
Second, the concurrent pieces of proof could be said to perfect one
another and hence add up to a full proof.4 Third, if one did not
permit the multiplicity of half-proofs to count as a full proof, crimes
would often go unpunished, which would violate the fundamental
purpose of the criminal law.'49 Finally, there was direct authority in
Roman law for the proposition that even a capital criminal case could
be proved by inferences and presumptions, if eyewitness testimony
were lacking. 50 On the other side, three arguments weighed in favor
of acquitting Seius. First, there was an analogy with civil litigation
involving extremely large sums. One of the Novels required proof by
three witnesses in cases involving more than a pound of gold. 5'
Pecuniary matters, no matter how great, lacked the importance of
criminal prosecutions, which placed the defendant's physical well-being
at risk. Hence, in criminal cases, a higher standard of proof should be
required, and sentence could not be passed based on the numerous
half-proofs recited in the case at hand.' Second, there was direct
textual authority in the Code and the Digest for the proposition that
a criminal defendant could not be convicted on the basis of indicia,
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no matter how manifest the circumstantial evidence.'53 Third, the facts
as recited added up to a presumption that Seius was guilty, but not to
the proof beyond doubt that defined "undoubted" indicia. If the proofs
were doubtful or uncertain in a criminal case that threatened the
defendant's soul, it was better to release a guilty man unpunished than
to condemn the innocent. 54 Having laid out both sides of the argument,
Gandinus provided his own solution to the quaestio: Seius could not
be convicted on the basis of the indicia in the hypothetical.'55 Gandinus
did not object to the proposition that a criminal defendant could be
convicted on the basis of undoubted indicia. He based his solution on
the circumstantial evidence in the hypothetical: it weighed enough to
create a presumption against Seius, but not enough to create proof
beyond doubt. Although such a presumption could "prove" a civil
case, criminal procedure required proof "clearer than the light of day"
because of the greater penalties that awaited the defendant if he were
convicted. '56
Gandinus solved the quaestio on its facts, but left a difficult issue
dangling. He accepted the authority of the Code, which said that a
criminal proof could consist of the testimony of two witnesses, or clear
documentary evidence, or undoubted indicia that made a proof clearer
than the light of day,'57 but what was the meaning of undoubted indicia?
To answer, Gandinus launched into a detailed list. Indicia constituted
a proof beyond doubt when they created an irrefutable presumption.
Hence, indicia could be "undoubted" if a crime were genuinely
notorious,'58 or if the defendant had confessed,'59 or if a presumption
of law arising from uncontroverted facts contradicted the defendant's
assertions, 60 or if the physical evidence irrefutably established a legal
conclusion concerning the essential elements of the case.' 6'
Notably, the final three items in Gandinus's list of examples of
"undoubted indicia" were Thomas de Piperata's three cases: the room
with one exit, the body in the vineyard, and the hired assassin.' 6' But
Gandinus mentioned them only to refute Thomas's analysis: "But
according to all of the wise men whom I have seen at Bologna and
elsewhere, and also as I have seen to be observed by custom, a person
cannot be definitively sentenced with a physical penalty on the basis
of such indicia.' 63 Nevertheless, Gandinus concluded, if the penalty
for the crime were monetary rather than physical, then a defendant
could be convicted just as Thomas had written, and in such a case it
would not matter whether the podesta had arbitrium or not. 64
The problem with Thomas's analysis, according to Gandinus, was
that Thomas was willing to call evidence "undoubted" when it was
not. There are few circumstantial proofs that are so irrefutable that
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nothing to the contrary can be suggested as a credible alternative.
Gandinus was not willing to regard a probable proof as a conclusive
one, except where the law recognized an irrefutable presumption.165 In
criminal procedure, the most important of such presumptions arose
when a misdeed was tried as a crimen notorium, a notorious crime.
Thus, Gandinus rejected Thomas de Piperata's conclusion that a
multitude of unrelated half-proofs could perfect each other to create a
full proof, but he did not suggest that there was no other way around
the two-witness rule. One practical dodge, which Gandinus considered
common practice, was to punish an offense with a staggering fine or
some other non-corporal sanction. It is clear that the city-states imposed
fines and exile rather than corporal punishment, even for homicide.
Possibly, this was to escape the stringency of the law of proof in criminal
cases involving corporal sanctions, but it might have been that fines
and exile were socially preferable to sanguinary punishments. 6
There remained one last gambit for the legal theorist seeking to
circumvent the two-witness rule: Gandinus conceded that a defendant
could be condemned on the basis of undoubted indicia, where the
crime were proved to be notorious. Gandinus, quoting Ubertino of
Bobbio, stated that notoriety existed when the populace or a majority
of the populace did not doubt that the deed had been committed.1
67
The more common definition was in Innocent III's decretals, which
permitted ecclesiastical judges to proceed in summary fashion per
notorium when popular knowledge of the matter so thoroughly estab-
lished the defendant's guilt that the truth could not be hidden by any
tergiversation. 6 1 It was the essence of procedure per notorium that the
judge did not need to unearth eyewitness testimony. The core of
notorium was based on common knowledge of circumstantial evidence
sufficient to convince the local populace.
In the case that produced the decretal defining notorium, Innocent
had permitted a judge to convict clerics who were widely known to
have had women living with them, but who had not been caught in
the act of fornication. 69 In fact, reformers within the hierarchy had
insisted since the first half of the 1100s that the need to punish deviant
behavior demanded a lower standard of proof and a more efficient
summary procedure- at least in cases where the miscreant's guilt was
manifest or notorious.' 70 On the other hand, since the 1140s, canonists
and then civilians had been insisting that these procedural shortcuts
undercut the rule of law. Procedure per notorium raised particularly
acute concerns because it omitted the formalities meant to protect
innocent defendants. The gloss to the decretals found it notable that
in procedure per notorium, no direct proof of the crime was necessary. 17
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Gandinus had a quote that captured the essence of procedure per
notorium: to follow the due process of law in cases of notorious crime
meant not to follow the due process of law. Instead, the defendant
whose crime was notorious was citied into court simply to hear sentence
pronounced against him.'72
If such summary procedures provided a large gain in the efficiency
of criminal justice, they suffered from an inescapable flaw. A fact that
was believed by the entire populace of any locale might or might not
be true. If the meaning of notoriety was the traditional canon law
notion that people "indubitably knew" the alleged fact, and if nothing
in this world could be known to an absolute certainty, then notoriety
tripped over the same stumbling block as "undoubted indicia." If
certainty of guilt were an alternative standard of proof, most of the
jurists would demand absolute certainty, not merely proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Hence, some jurists gutted the notion of crimen
notorium by arguing that a matter could never be notorious so long as
the defendant denied the case against him.'
Gandinus thought that some crimes were genuinely notorious, but
he required a very high standard of certainty; for example, if the crime
were committed before the judge and many other witnesses.'74 Alter-
natively, if the judge had no firsthand impressions, the crime could still
be proved to be notorious if there were enough witnesses to prove it."'
At this point Gandinus departed from the logic of crimen notorium by
demanding that the witnesses testify both that the matter was notorious
and that they, the witnesses, had seen the crime being committed in a
public place in daylight.'76 This standard of proof would make it harder
to prove a crime per notorium than to prove it through the two-witness
rule. Gandinus did concede that other jurists adhered to a lesser
standard that did not require the witnesses to testify that they had seen
the defendant committing the crime, but only that it was notorious
because everybody knew that he had done it.'
Thus, Gandinus defended the traditional rules of law against Thomas
de Piperata's attempt to lower the standard of proof, concluding that
the public interest in efficient prosecution did not outweigh the tradi-
tional rules of law protecting innocent defendants. However, he did
not mechanically reiterate the scholastic rule that proof required two
witnesses or a confession. Gandinus grudgingly conceded that un-
doubted indicia could lead to punishment, especially in the case of
crimen notorium, but he was more comfortable in applying the lower
standard to criminal cases that resulted only in pecuniary punishment. '78
"Due process" constraints upon judicial discretion applied as long
as the discussion was bounded by the principles of the ius commune.
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Gandinus, like Thomas de Piperata, believed that the law of proof was
different where local statutory law gave the podest broad power to
prosecute and punish criminal offenders. In his discussion of the law
of torture, Gandinus raised the following case: Suppose that a homicide
has been committed so secretly that nobody knows who was the
perpetrator. Subsequently, public authorities capture an individual of
low social condition and ill fame. A public outcry and fama arise,
accusing. him of the unsolved murder."79 Clearly, according to the
principles of the ius commune, such a defendant could not be tortured
solely on the basis of fama. But if the podesta had been granted broad
discretion (liberum et generale arbitrium), could he proceed to torture
the defendant without any indicia?8 ° Here Gandinus followed Thomas's
arguments almost literally. Arbitrium, he wrote, gives the podesta free
rein. To grant the magistrate arbitrium is to say that he may proceed
according to his own conscience.' 8' Hence, Gandinus, like Thomas,
cast the statutory grant of discretion as a legislative rejoinder to the
rule of law that "the judge must rule according to the law and not
according to his conscience." '82 Therefore, the judge who possessed
arbitrium was largely exempt from the learned law, but not from the
fundamental solemnitas iuris that required some slight quantum of
evidence before the judge could torture the defendant.'83
Having stated that arbitrium liberated the judge from the rules of
law with regard to the criminal process, Gandinus spelled out a
limitation. Although a judge might omit many of the solemnities of
the law, arbitrium did not allow him to omit them altogether;'84
according to the Digest, questions of fact lay within the judge's
discretion, but the authority of the laws stood beyond it. '85 Even with
the broadest grant of discretion, the podestai must take care not to
convict on the basis of pure arbitrium, conscience, or the testimony
of one witness, for in pronouncing on guilt or innocence, the judge
must follow the laws.'86 Still, Gandinus reiterated Thomas de Piperata's
conclusion: If the crime were not fully proven by two witnesses'
testimony or by the defendant's confession, a judge with arbitrium
could convict the defendant as long as his conscience and his intellect
were in accord with the evidence.'87 The judge with arbitrium was not
liable for convicting people on the basis of formally insufficient proof,
as long as he acted in good faith.'88
In sum, Gandinus's response to Thomas de Piperata was equivocal.
Where the Tractatus de maleficiis subscribed to Thomas's idea about
the breadth of judicial discretion under a grant of arbitrium, Gandinus
neglected to mention his source, even though he quoted Thomas
verbatim. Where Gandinus disagreed with Thomas on the extent to
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which the ius commune permitted proof by circumstantial evidence,
Gandinus quoted him by name, observing with some relish that none
of the learned lawyers at Bologna agreed with Thomas's ideas about
indicia indubitata 9 To Gandinus, Thomas de Piperata was a juris-
prudential pariah.
More importantly, Gandinus exemplified the jurists's ambivalent
attitude toward human discretion in the criminal process. Nothing in
the Tractatus de maleficiis suggests that its author lacked faith in
human capacity to act or judge responsibly. On the contrary, Gandinus
was aware that Italian city-states routinely granted their criminal judges
extensive arbitrium, bounded only by the requirements of good faith
and, perhaps, a measure of prudence. 9 ' Yet he was troubled by the
fallibility and uncertainty of human judgment where a defendant's life
and limbs were at stake, and he insisted that the "due process" of ius
commune must not be watered down by slippery legal reasoning. Hence,
exceptions to the two-witness rule could be carved out by legislative
initiative,' 9 ' or by careful interpretation of the corpus of Roman law,'92
but not by Thomas's device of calling circumstantial evidence "un-
doubted" when it was not. Gandinus was more scrupulous than Thomas
de Piperata when it came to defending the rule of law, but neither he
nor Thomas was a slave to mechanical rules of proof.
Finally, one can not pass over Gandinus's discussion of torture, nor
the social attitude reflected there. First, it is clear that Gandinus was
not "forced" into adopting torture as the only available means of
producing convictions under the prevailing law of proof. It is true that
witness-proof was difficult to establish, while confessions were easy to
extract from defendants who had been tortured; it is true that despite
the well-known risk of producing false confessions, the scholastic jurists
took comfort from the fact that in the learned law, such confessions
were full, legitimate proof. But the jurists, especially those who had
presided over criminal courts, were aware of the perversity of torture
as an investigatory device. They knew that the victim of torture would
confess to whatever crimes the inquisitor suggested.'93
Gandinus was far from squeamish about torture, but even his
enthusiasm was tempered by the need for immoderately cruel judges
to be restrained in the practice of torture.'94 Unfortunately, this is not
clear from his example, a hypothetical case arising "every day in fact":
A crime is committed, but it is not clear who committed it. After
several days, somebody is arrested for the crime and hauled before the
criminal court. The defendant is a man of low social condition and ill
fame. After his arrest, a public outcry arises, accusing him of having
committed the crime. There is no evidence against him except his own
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bad reputation and the publicfama which arose from unknown persons
after the defendant had been captured. Can the judge proceed to torture
the accused? '95 The legal answer should have been easy to determine
in the negative, becausefama by itself proved nothing, and the suspect's
ill social condition proved nothing relating to the commission of the
crime. But Gandinus argued that a person of ignoble status, who had
led a life of ill fame, had no claim on the protection of the very laws
that he habitually flouted.'96 Just as the judge under Roman law had
had the authority to torture witnesses of ignoble status or ill fame, so
Gandinus thought the medieval judge should torture a defendant who
had made a bad example of himself, even if it were uncertain who had
committed that particular crime.'97 If the judge employed the most
terrifying tortures against such a defendant, it would be an example to
deter others from wrongdoing.'98
Two important inferences follow from Gandinus's solution to this
hypothetical. First, it is clear that torture was not being used exclusively
as an investigative tool. Among the justifications for torture, Gandinus
recited the judge's duty to investigate the truth, but he did not care
that the defendant who led a life outside the law might not have
committed the particular crime of which he stood accused. Torture,
then, was being used more or less consciously as a form of punishment
and not just as a means of securing confessions. Second, Gandinus
provides a significant clue about the incidence of torture in thirteenth-
century Italy. A judge could not torture every criminal defendant even
if there was clear circumstantial evidence: Citizens enjoyed certain
protections, official and unofficial, against capricious judicial torture. 199
The foreigner, the person without a guild, and the poor person without
extensive family connections faced the prospect of torture, conviction,
and brutal corporal punishment. Conversely, even when they were
guilty, citizens of moderately prosperous standing faced less risk to life
or limb. The socially less divisive course was to permit them to go into
exile. 2" If one can judge by Gandinus's work, torture was not employed
as often as one would have expected if it were the only means of
escaping the inefficiencies created by the scholastic law of proof.2"'
Beginning in the twelfth century, but especially after 1200, scholas-
tically trained jurists were keenly aware of the issues concerning due
process and the law of proof that were raised by Thomas de Piperata
and Albertus Gandinus. The proceduralists from Durantis onward were
concerned with the problem of standards of proof that might give an
inquisitorial judge discretion to avoid the stringency of full, formal
proof. But they all hesitated over moving too far from the traditional
rules that protected the criminal defendant. For the proceduralists, the
Law and History Review
conundrum was giving the magistrate discretion to weigh circumstantial
evidence while realizing that no amount of indicia could ever create
absolute certainty of guilt and thus satisfy the most demanding inter-
pretation of the requirement that criminal proofs be "clearer than the
light of day. 2 2 For civil jurists such as Thomas de Piperata and Albertus
Gandinus, who were immersed in the everyday affairs of the Italian
city-state, the least painful means of escaping this dilemma was to look
beyond the boundaries of the learned law. Legislative action gave what
Roman law withheld: grants of arbitrium gave the podestd the "free
rein" that the ius commune denied.
The Canonists: William Durantis, Joannes Andreae, and Hostiensis
The jurists trained in the canon law tradition who wrote about
procedure in the ecclesiastical courts did not enjoy such a convenient
escape from the problem of proof. From the twelfth century onward,
they agreed that the ecclesiastical judge possessed arbitrium in several
areas of criminal procedure,0 3 but nowhere did the canons grant an
ordinary trial judge the "full and free discretion" that was a routine
feature of Italian statutory law. Given the Church's emphasis on
hierarchical control over an intricate appellate procedure, it is not
surprising that the local ordinary exercised only a limited discretion,
in contrast to the broad authority of a secular podesta. Theoretically,
the ecclesiastical trial judge's limited powers did not reflect indifference
to the problem of catching and punishing malefactors. The hierarchy
was as committed to criminal prosecution as the city-states were. After
all, it was Pope Innocent III who reintroduced the ancient Roman
notion that public interest demands that crime must be punished.2"
Innocent, and not the city-states, took the initiative in adopting the
inquisitorial process to side-step the inefficiencies of the accusatorial
procedure. 0 It was Innocent who provided the jurists with the concept
of crimen notorium that could condemn a suspect summarily when
the evidence was such that "the crime can not be concealed by any
tergiversation."2 6 Nevertheless, given the hierarchy's commitment to
maintaining the honored and elite status of the clergy, there remained
a powerful inducement to preserving the "due process" that protected
clerics from harassment or embarrassment. The Church feared attacks
upon the clergy as much as it feared deviant clerics, and the canonists
feared scandal most of all.
The canonists who wrote on procedure walked a narrower line than
did the civil jurists whose practical socialization took place in the courts
of the city-states. For example, the evidence about a crime might be
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so negligible that the matter was best labelled occultum or secret.20 7 In
such cases, judgment was reserved for the Almighty: "the Church does
not judge hidden things."2 ' Alternatively, a crime could be nearly
secret, or pene occultum, if only a handful of people knew the facts. If
such a crime were a minor breach that posed no danger to the
community, it was considered preferable to pass over the matter without
prosecution to avoid scandal-even if there were enough witnesses to
secure a full proof.20 9 If the "nearly secret" crime was serious (a crimen
enorme), or posed a social danger, then it would merit energetic
prosecution."0 Heresy was the paradigmatic example of the secret crime
that was difficult to prove but demanded prosecution.
After occultum was the crime that was manifestum. A crime was
manifest when there was a public outcry arising from certain knowledge
of the facts and originating from known persons.2" Some canonical
authorities proposed that manifest crimes did not require legal proof, 1 2
but the proceduralists concluded that a crimen manifestum was distin-
guished by the ease with which it could be proved by witnesses, not
by being an exception to the normal rules of proof."3
Beyond the crimen manifestum was the crimen notorium, which did
not require witness-proof or confession. William Durantis defined
notorious crime more elaborately than Innocent III. According to the
Speculum iudiciale, there were three elements to notoriety: public
outcry, circumstantial evidence sufficient to pre-empt any attempt to
hide the truth, and public notice extending to most of the local
populace.21 ' Even if a crime met this definition of notoriety, however,
the canonists were leery of any departure from the traditional rules of
proof. So strictly did they define notorium that the judge who followed
the letter of the Speculum iudiciale could employ the summary pro-
cedure per notorium only if the crime were committed in the presence
of the judge himself, while he was acting in his official capacity,' 15 and
in the presence of a number of people large enough to establish public
knowledge of the facts.2 6 Unless these conditions were met, the
defendant could escape from summary procedure per notorium simply
by denying his guilt.
The canonists who wrote about procedure accorded the trial judge
much less discretion than did Thomas de Piperata and Albertus
Gandinus, the Romanists. This difference between canonists and ci-
vilians reflects the contrast between the ecclesiastical judge, who was
constrained by a hierarchy jealous of its power to control subordinates
through its appellate jurisdiction, and the secular judge, whose broad
mandate to prosecute crime was subject only to a good faith interpre-
tation of the law. The "due process" values that underlay the stringent
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scholastic law of proof therefore fared better in the ecclesiastical courts-
other than the Holy Office of the Inquisition-than in secular courts.
While Gandinus claimed that a lawless man did not deserve the
protection of the laws, and Thomas de Piperata that the podesta enjoyed
free rein, the canonists, Hostiensis and William Durantis, fretted that
the inquisitorial judge's power was getting out of hand: ' 7 Judges were
defrocking clerics who had no opportunity to be heard in their own
defense. According to Hostiensis, even a heretic must receive a legitimate
opportunity to defend himself," 8 although in prosecuting heresy the
canonists permitted many short-cuts, the Holy Office of the Inquisition
in particular subverting the notion of fair process.29
Still, Hostiensis, who was not squeamish about employing short-cuts
against the obviously guilty defendant, claimed it was the podesta,
rather than the ecclesiastical judge, who commonly omitted the for-
malities of the law in doubtful cases and punished suspects without a
fair hearing.2 0 Hostiensis was expressing a conviction shared by all the
canonists when he wrote that even though the judge presiding over a
proceeding per notorium had the power to proceed with no citation
and without proofs, it was better and safer to conduct a hearing, unless
the delay would create scandal or grave public danger.22" ' Unlike some
canonists, Hostiensis believed that the trial judge did have the discretion
to punish a notoriously guilty defendant without full proofs, in spite
of the defendant's denial of guilt.222 But a good, prudent judge would
do nothing arbitrarily, safeguarding the truth rather than obeying the
dictates of will.223
In such a tradition, Thomas de Piperata's ideas about discretion and
the law of proof attracted little enthusiasm. Durantis wrote the Speculum
iudiciale before Thomas composed his Tractatus de fama, so there is
no trace of Thomas in the Speculator's great opus."2 A generation
later, when Joannes Andreae published his additiones to the Speculum
iudiciale, he did mention Thomas, but not favorably. Joannes thought
that Thomas's definition of fama was verbose,225 and that his analysis
was mixed up with indicia, arguments, and presumptions.2 2 6 Although
he summarized much of the Tractatus de fama, Joannes Andreae
passed silently over Thomas's conclusions about the podestb's discretion
under a grant of statutory arbitrium and about fashioning a plena
probatio from undoubted indicia.227
This silence cannot have resulted from ignorance of the canonists
about secular experiments with criminal procedure. Durantis and
Joannes Andreae were aware that the communes condemned defendants
in absentia to exile and outlawry, contrary to the rules of learned law.
According to Durantis, the criminal ban meant that a podestaz could
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legitimately condemn a defendant in absentia, without an opportunity
to be heard. The ban arose if the defendant was accused of homicide
and failed to respond to a summons. Under a typical Italian statute,
a defendant who failed to respond to a capital charge within a year
could be treated as if he had confessed and condemned in absentia.228
If the defendant were subsequently captured, Durantis concluded that
the exile could be executed without further ado.229
Joannes Andreae arrived at a conclusion more in keeping with the
traditional Roman law. Despite a statute that permitted the magistrate
to decapitate or hang a defendant who had been condemned in absentia
and subsequently captured, Joannes maintained that the penalty was
governed by the authority of the ius commune and could not lie within
the discretion of the judge. Although the Italian practice was otherwise,
Joannes insisted that as a matter of law, the defendant convicted in
absentia must have an opportunity to prove his innocence, while his
accuser must have the opportunity to prove the captive's guilt.23 ° From
this, it is clear that Durantis and Joannes Andreae knew about the
secular magistrate's statutory powers. If Joannes neglected to discuss
Thomas de Piperata's idea that arbitrium meant discretion to condemn
on the basis of the judge's conscience, it was because Joannes had
already made it clear that the judge was constrained to decide guilt or
innocence according to the strict rules of law.
Thus, the thirteenth-century canonists' attitude toward judicial dis-
cretion ran counter to the expansive impulses of secular statutes and
the Romanists. As Bonifacius Antelmi phrased it at the close of the
thirteenth century, "judges should not presume to act according to
their consciences, as many of them do, ignorant of justice and of the
law, but according to the laws and the proofs offered to them."23" '
Bartolus
The debate over discretion and the law of proof continued throughout
the age of scholastic jurisprudence. The greatest of all the medieval
jurists, Bartolus of Saxoferrato (+1357), supported the notion, found
in the works of Thomas de Piperata and Albertus Gandinus, that the
inquisitorial judge exercised broad discretion. In the inquisitorial pro-
cedure, wrote Bartolus, the judge has more free rein than you might
think.232 Bartolus might have acquired the phrase "free rein" from
Thomas de Piperata. Discussing fama, the great jurist cited his obscure
predecessor with approval that verged on enthusiasm: "Whatever
Thomas said, I will say to you. The Speculator... also wrote about
fama but not clearly"233
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As it happened, Bartolus did not repeat whatever Thomas had said
about fama, but he did share Thomas's central insight: criminal proof,
in its essence, is the fact-finder's subjective certainty, and not an objective
calculus. "A full proof," wrote Bartolus, "occurs when the judge on
the basis of the evidence produced before him, is led to faith and credit
concerning that which is litigated."23 ' One could acquire certitude,
Bartolus thought, through direct sensory experience, as witnesses did
or through reasoning and demonstration. 35 The judge could attain
such certainty only in cases involving permanent facts that he could
ascertain by direct observation. With transient events, the highest level
of certainty that one could reach after the fact was faith and credit.236
To reach such certainty, the judge moved from ignorance of the whole
case, to doubts prompted by the conflict between the parties' assertions,
to suspicion, to opinion, and finally to firm belief. If the case presented
by one party convinced the judge beyond any doubt, then there was a
perfect proof.237
Bartolus believed that a judge enjoyed considerable latitude in arriving
at his firm belief, but was bounded by the solemnities of the law. The
trial judge, for example, had the power to decide whether to believe
the witnesses' testimony or not.23 A prudent judge who disbelieved a
witness ought to record the basis of his skepticism. Moreover, in the
real world, the judge's discretionary power to initiate proceedings or
to employ torture, might be bound by the expectation that an inquis-
itorial judge ought to torture defendants, even if the evidence was
flimsy.2 3 9
With regard to criminal proof, Bartolus was more concerned about
dubious reasoning than accounting systems of fractional proofs and
full proof. He resisted the notion that two half-proofs added up to a
full proof in any case, civil or criminal, unless the half-proofs were of
the same genus, such as two eyewitness accounts, and the partial proofs
pointed to the same conclusion.24 ° As for the rule of law that required
criminal proofs to be "clearer than the light of day," Bartolus believed
that presumptions and indicia could measure up to that standard. His
authority was the Roman law presumption that a man was guilty of
adultery if he were apprehended in another man's house in the owner's
wife's company.24" ' His rationale was that circumstantial evidence
amounted to proof clearer than the light of day when it sufficed to
convince the judge.242
Bartolus's theory that the judge's subjective certainty of guilt was
enough to convict seemingly conflicted with the traditional rule that
"the judge must rule according to the things alleged and proved, and
not according to his conscience," but Bartolus perceived no conflict.
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The rule prohibiting verdicts according to conscience, he wrote, forbade
the judge to use information that he acquired as a private person.
Bartolus expected the judge to decide each case on the basis of
conscience, informed solely by the pleadings, the evidence, and the
rules of law as presented to him.243
Thus, Bartolus relied more upon prudence than ironclad rules. On
the subject of indicia, for example, he felt that it was impossible to
articulate a firm doctrine, and that the threshold of circumstantial
evidence required before torture could be employed was a matter best
left to judicial discretion.244 Nevertheless, despite the impossibility of
forming a doctrine that would guide the judge in every case, Bartolus
proceeded to try, through the device of a hypothetical. Suppose, he
wrote, someone were accused of theft. The circumstantial evidence
against him included the following: He was a man of low condition
and ill fame, in the habit of committing similar crimes; he was at the
scene of the crime; he knew the house, because he had spent time
there; after the theft he had fled and hidden; subsequently he was found
to have spent money, although previously he had been poor, and the
source of his new wealth was unknown; and finally, some of the stolen
property was found on his person.245 For the reader familiar with
Thomas de Piperata's work, this hypothetical has a familiar ring; it
sounds like Thomas's cases of circumstantial proof beyond doubt. But
Bartolus was more subtle than Thomas, and he was not ready to call
these "special" indicia conclusive proof. There was still room for doubt,
as long as the presumptions arising from even the most powerful
circumstantial evidence could be rebutted by the suspect. For example,
Bartolus wrote, if stolen goods were found in my possession, I could
rebut the evidence of my guilt by identifying the person from whom
I received the goods.246 Therefore, Bartolus urged judicial restraint, in
the form of hesitation to condemn on the basis of suspicion or
presumption.247 Moreover, where the penalty was death, Bartolus ad-
hered to the traditional rule that a judge could not condemn an absent
party.248 This freed the judge from the unworkable restraints of the
strict Roman law of proof by two witnesses or confession, but did not
give him "free rein."
For Bartolus, proof to a standard of faith and credit implied a high
level of certainty, backed up by a procedural rule that insured that in
capital cases the defendant would have an opportunity to rebut the
case against him. It was a concession to practicality that in quasi-
capital cases, where the penalty was banishment and outlawry, a
defendant could be condemned in absentia.249 Although this violated
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the formal rules of Roman law, it conformed to contemporary statutes,
and for Bartolus, that was good enough.25°
Since he was not enslaved by the two-witness standard, Bartolus was
impatient with inventions meant to circumvent the traditional law of
proof. The whole category of notorious crimes, he wrote, was an
invention of the canonists, not of the civilians.25" ' Moreover, transient
facts could not be notorious; only "permanent" or long-lasting facts
could be called notorious."' Although other jurists had tried to extend
the scope of judicial discretion concerning crimen notorium, Bartolus
asked, "What is there for a judge to determine?" The only fact that is
genuinely notorious is one that, by its very nature, everybody knows
or ought to know, so that one cannot claim to be ignorant of it without
admitting that one's ignorance amounts to negligence.5 3 Bartolus was
not enamored of procedure per notorium as an escape from the full
and fair criminal process. He was more tolerant of the category of
"manifest" crimes, probably because crimen manifestum was a creation
of the ancient Roman law, and its legal consequences were less serious
then those of notorium.254 Hence, a thief who was caught in the act of
theft or even in possession of stolen goods was a manifest thief, liable
to a four-fold penalty.255 Similarly, if a man were caught in someone
else's house with a pretty woman, he was a manifest adulterer.256 Finally,
if a man were seen fleeing with a drawn sword and someone were
found slain at the scene, then the crime was a manifest homicide.257
This last hypothetical is reminiscent of one of Thomas's cases
illustrating proof beyond doubt by circumstantial evidence-the room
with one exit.25 Bartolus, however, used it to point to a different
conclusion. The homicide in Bartolus's hypothetical was "manifest;'
but it was not proved, as Thomas might have argued, by "undoubted
indicia." Unlike Thomas, Bartolus might have permitted the judge to
convict the accused only if the defendant could offer no credible
explanation for the drawn sword.259
Among the medieval jurists, Bartolus displayed the least mechanical
concept of legal proof. He did not enslave the judge to the two-witness
rule, and he rejected the facile solutions of torturing a confession from
every suspect or adding up fractional proofs to make a "full" proof.
For Bartolus, the judge decided guilt or innocence according to his
conscience as formed by the evidence. The judge, restrained only by a
requirement of faith and credit in the evidence presented, held the
power to decide according to conscience because the state gave him
that power.26°
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Angelus Aretinus
A century later, Bartolus was being hailed as authority for the
proposition that proof in criminal cases could be based upon indicia
indubitata. Angelus Aretinus de Gambilionibus, author of the last
major treatise on criminal law to appear before the age of printing,
expressly supported the position that nobody could be condemned on
the basis of indicia unless they were "undoubted."26 ' Angelus taught
that an indicium was indubitatum or plenum ("full"), when the cir-
cumstantial evidence provided a clear explanation of the facts, through
"sufficient signs," so that the intellect was satisfied and did not care to
inquire any further.162 Angelus illustrated his point by providing an
example of indicia indubitata -Thomas de Piperata's hypothetical of
the room with one exit. 263 Angelus did not mention Thomas. Instead,
he named Nicholas de Matarellis, Baldus, and Salicetus as authorities
for the proposition that indicia were undoubted "when the law desires
that a conviction be based upon such evidence": indicia that are
undoubted in the eyes of the law ought to be undoubted to the judge.264
If the indicia were not approved by the law, but were committed to
the judge's discretion, they could not be the basis for a conviction. 65
It is not clear what legal restraint Angelus was trying to invoke here,
because he went on to say that one could find an example of indicia
indubitata wherever the quantity and the quality of the circumstantial
evidence pointed out the truth in the mind's eye of the judge, "just as
a bright light shows the truth to one's physical eyes:' 266 Angelus's
"bright light" metaphor was an unmistakable allusion to the Roman
law rule that criminal proofs must be as "clear as light. 2 67 Angelus
was making the same claim Bartolus had made a century before: proof
that convinced the judge beyond doubt satisfied the standard that
demanded proof as clear as the light of day. Angelus was aware that
he was following in the great jurist's footsteps, and he cited Bartolus
as the source of his hypothetical case. Suppose, wrote Angelus, that a
person was seen entering Titius's house. Immediately thereafter Titius
was heard crying out. Then the suspect was seen leaving the house
with a bloody sword, and Titius was found, wounded in the face.268
These indicia taken together were beyond doubt, concluded Angelus,
and the culprit could be convicted for the assault on Titius.2 69 Bartolus,
Angelus concluded, had so determined in similar examples. 270
Strictly speaking, Angelus misstated the case when he claimed Bar-
tolus as his authority. Bartolus might have decided that the assault on
Titius was a manifest crime, but he would not have accepted the bare
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facts of Angelus's hypothetical case as sufficient for conviction, because
the presumption of guilt arising from even such powerful indicia was
still rebuttable .27 In fact, Girolamo Giganti, a sixteenth-century jurist,
took Angelus to task on this point. Bartolus was not the source of
Angelus's ideas about indicia indubitata, Giganti wrote, Thomas de
Piperata was. Moreover, this doctrine had been rejected by the Bolognese
law faculty.2 72 Even by the sixteenth century, Thomas was still a pariah
to most of the scholastic jurists. But while the memory of Thomas de
Piperata was hazy and hostile, his ideas about judicial discretion and
the law of proof retained the power to attract both support and spirited
opposition.
273
The Jurist in Social Context:
Thomas de Piperata and Thirteenth-Century
Attitudes about Human Discretion
The Tractatus de fana thus delivered much more than its title
promised. Beginning from the procedural uncertainties about fama,
Thomas surreptitiously moved to a potentially revolutionary conclusion
about the law of proof in criminal cases. Thomas de Piperata was the
first scholastic jurist to suggest expressly that the standard of proof in
criminal cases should be that of certainty beyond doubt in the mind
of a fact-finder who possessed wide discretion. 7 ' This idea represents
a striking departure from traditional early medieval attitudes about the
human capacity to discover truth, and from twelfth-century scholastic
strictures concerning proof. Many medievalists have believed that
thirteenth-century Europeans were not willing to make the leap from
ordeal, or proof by divine judgment, to a system that depended on
human discretion.2 75 Thus, the abandonment of proof by appeal to
divine judgment led to the adoption of a stringent, non-discretionary
rule that in criminal cases, nothing short of the testimony of two
eyewitnesses or confession by the accused would suffice for conviction.276
Since covert crimes do not generate eyewitness testimony, and since
no amount of circumstantial evidence could substitute for the testimony,
John Langbein has argued that medieval civil and canon law turned
to torture in order to satisfy the alternative requirement of confession.277
The judge who administered the criminal process was "an automaton,"
according to Langbein, because ordinary people in thirteenth-century
Europe found it difficult to accept human judgment in place of the
divine judgment of ordeals.2 7' Another version of the medieval judge
is that of an accountant whose function was simply to total the fractions
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of proof against a defendant, and then to condemn him only if the
fractions added up to a "full proof," or the legal equivalent of two
unimpeachable witnesses' testimony" 9 Even Charles Donahue, whose
work on proof by witnesses in medieval church courts reflects a shrewd
estimate of the inevitability of judicial discretion in weighing the
admissibility and the credibility of testimony, subscribed to this notion
that thirteenth-century Europeans could not bring themselves to replace
the divine judgement with human.28 °
Thomas de Piperata's Tractatus defama and the subsequent juristic
debate about discretion and proof suggest emphatically that thirteenth-
century Europeans did not suffer from a critical lack of faith in human
judgment. The image of the inquisitorial judge as an automaton captures
only one side of a perennial scholastic debate about the scope ofjudicial
discretion. That side of the debate expressed itself in several popular
maxims: the judge must adjudicate according to the laws and the
evidence, and not according to his conscience;28" ' the proof in a criminal
case had to be as clear as the light of day;282 and nobody could be
condemned unless he had been legitimately convicted by the testimony
of two witnesses or by his own confession.283 These arguments were
not grounded in an inability to trust human discretion. Rather, the
medieval debate concerning discretion featured problems that are
relatively familiar to present-day jurists: how to accord the court enough
flexibility to prosecute crimes efficiently without removing too many
of the constraints that appear to ensure that the defendant will have a
fair chance to prove his innocence.
Doubts about discretionary justice did not begin, as some have
suggested, when the abolition of ordeals created a need to fashion a
new law of proof.28 4 Discretion had played a pivotal role in the old
procedures that used ordeals, so much so that one of the major criticisms
of ordeal was that the procedures were too easily manipulated.28 5 If
anything, scholastically trained jurists possessed increasing confidence
in human judgment during the 1200s, when Aristotle's theories of
active human intellection, and of the natural origins of human society
and its government permeated the study of arts, theology, and law.286
William Durantis, Thomas de Piperata, and Albertus Gandinus lived
in the intellectual milieu of Thomas Aquinas,287 not the mystical one
of Bernard of Clairvaux.288 In urban culture, it would be anachronistic
to cast the thirteenth-century man on the street as a superstitious
bumpkin who trusted more in miracles and portents of divine or
magical powers than in the works of man. As for the jurists, the native
Bolognese professors who were born into the city's ruling oligarchy
were deeply involved in the quotidian problem of governing a city-
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state through the exercise of discretionary political judgments. The
scholastic jurists did not merely study Aristotelian politics; they lived
them.
It is misleading to rely too much on the jurists' theoretical works,
in which formal constraints upon judicial discretion loom large. Me-
dievalists have been more scholastic than the scholastic jurists were
themselves, emphasizing legal doctrine at the expense of social context.
Thomas de Piperata pointed his reader in another direction when he
liberated the podesta from the restraints of the scholastic law of proof
with statutory grants of arbitrium. In thirteenth-century urban statutes,
the grant of plenum et liberum arbitrium was a common means of
defining the magistrates' authority to prosecute and punish crimes.2 9
Thomas's own quaestiones disputatae provide evidence that the com-
munal grant of arbitrium was perceived to be and intended as a public
interest measure that exempted magistrates from some of the formal
constraints of the ius commune so that they could punish crime more
efficiently.29 Statutes that confer broad official discretion to pursue a
campaign against crime do not reflect widespread scruples about human
judgment.
This is not to say that even reform-minded, non-traditional medieval
jurists felt entirely comfortable with sweeping grants of discretionary
power. In the Tractatus de fama, Thomas de Piperata relied heavily
on statutory arbitrium to fashion his radical law of proof, but two of
his quaestiones disputatae established the limits of statutory arbitrium."'
The first of these quaestiones concerned the judge's power over indi-
viduals who offered surety for a criminal defendant.292 The defendant
did appear and was convicted, but he failed to pay the fine imposed
by the court. The podesta, who held arbitrium in criminal cases,
demanded that the sureties pay the fine for the defendant. Thomas
concluded that the sureties had pledged security only for the appearance
of the defendant at trial, and that the judge's discretionary power did
not extend to making the sureties pay the defendant's fine. Thomas
argued that the judge had discretionary power concerning crimes and
criminals, but the obligation of the bondsman was not part of the
criminal case.293 This restriction was supported by a series of substantive
arguments against extending the judges' discretionary power too far.
Thomas explained that arbitrium was an iniquity, contrary to the ius
commune,2 9 4 and odious because some judges used it to condemn the
innocent and absolve the guilty.295 Hence, he believed, grants of
arbitrium should not be extended beyond the narrowest definition of
the criminal elements of the case.
In another question, Thomas posed a case that raised the issue of
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the temporal limits of arbitrium.296 In this case, a man who was
wounded during a past podestat's term died during the term of the
present podestai, who possessed arbitrium to punish homicide. 97 The
question was, which podesti had jurisdiction to prosecute and punish
the crime? Strikingly, Thomas concluded that neither the past podesti
nor the present one could prosecute the case.298 The former podestg's
arbitrium to punish homicide did not apply because the crime of
homicide was inchoate until the victim actually died, by which time
the magistrate's arbitrium had ceased to exist.2 9  Presumably, the former
podesti) could have convicted the assailant for some lesser crime, but
not for a crime that had not yet occurred when the magistrate's term
expired. Similarly, the present podesta lacked jurisdiction because only
the consequences of the wrongdoing, and not the act, fell within the
temporal limits of his arbitrium.3° Thus, neither podesti had power
to prosecute because the elements of the crime of homicide did not
coalesce during the existence of either grant of arbitrium.
This result appears at first glance to be absurd. The inability to
prosecute for homicide was expressly contrary to public utility, as it
left a homicide unavenged °' Odder still, Thomas's analysis runs
contrary to a famous case recorded in the Digest, a case which he must
have known about." 2 This was the famous instance of the slave who
was "killed twice." Having been mortally wounded by one assailant,
he was dispatched by a second. °3 In that case, the Roman jurist Julianus
had argued that both assailants were liable. The result was logically
absurd, one death resulting in two separate crimes, but Julianus thought
it would have been still more absurd to absolve both assailants or to
condemn one rather than the other. 4 Thomas de Piperata analyzed
the intervening events to produce just the opposite conclusion. The
question is why he labored to come to a decision that departed from
the opinion expressed in the Digest and left a homicide unpunished.
Thomas's curious conclusions about the temporal limits of arbitrium
contain a key to understanding the jurists' attitudes, and perhaps the
wider social perception of judicial power. It is clear that neither the
authors of statutes that granted arbitrium nor the jurists who interpreted
them as giving the podestti "free rein"3 5 hesitated for a moment to
permit judges in criminal cases to exercise wide discretion. For a
number of jurists who followed Thomas de Piperata, this discretion
extended even to the point of convicting defendants on the basis of
proof that was less than formally perfect under Roman law. What
frightened thirteenth-century Europeans was not the existence or the
exercise of discretionary power, but its abuse. Thus, communes were
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willing to grant extensive judicial discretion, but only for brief, discon-
tinuous terms.
Thomas characterized arbitrium as odious because judges who pos-
sessed wide discretion could abuse it by condemning the innocent and
absolving the guilty.3 6 It was to be feared in the fractious, volatile city-
state, where harsh criminal sanctions were periodically meted out
against members of political factions that fell from power or failed to
displace their rivals.3"7 In such a setting, it was crucial to rotate public
officers every half-year or year to prevent any incumbent from gaining
enough power to become a tyrant. One consequence of this system of
checks was that grants of criminal jurisdiction were conceived of as
being wholly personal and discontinuous. The arbitrium that was
granted to one podesta terminated with his departure from office, and
his successor's arbitrium was created ex nihilo, as a wholly discrete
grant of power. The office of a criminal judge did not exist continuously
through the comings and goings of successive magistrates, but died
with the departure of each incumbent. Thomas de Piperata's approach
to judicial power reflected the social and political realities of thirteenth-
century Italy. He argued that the public interest in punishing crimes
required broad grants of discretion to urban magistrates, but that the
suppression of crime could not justify any departure from the prudent
policy of placing strict temporal limits upon grants of public authority.
Thomas de Piperata's writings point out that the medieval attitude
toward judicial discretion was much more complex than expected.
Clearly, he believed that human judges had the capacity to attain
certainty beyond doubt, and that statutory grants of arbitrium permitted
them to convict on the basis of such certainty, based on circumstantial
evidence.3 8 However, he did not portray arbitrium as wholly unfettered
discretion. The judge had to observe at least some of the solemnities
of the law, even if arbitrium permitted him to avoid the full stringency
of the law of proof.30 9 This reflects something similar to a "due process"
mentality, a sense that public authority cannot legitimately impose
criminal sanctions without giving the accused a chance of defense.
Certainly this kind of "due process" mentality formed Bartolus's ideas
about the limits of judicial discretion. In an age prior to the theory of
individual rights against capricious search and seizure, self-incrimina-
tion, or cruel and unusual punishment, the only "due process" restraints
were procedural ones: a "probable cause" threshold for initiating the
criminal process,3"' a requirement that the defendant receive notice
and have an opportunity to be heard,31 and a requirement of a high
standard of proof. Each of these procedural safeguards had its excep-
tions, but no jurist was willing to abandon them altogether. Even
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Thomas was not willing to abandon all formal restraints upon the
judge's discretion in the law of proof; he believed that the judge could
condemn when the formal proofs were "a little deficient," but the
circumstantial evidence added up to proof beyond doubt.3 2 Finally,
Thomas's most serious concerns about the limits of judicial discretion
were political or constitutional ones; a judge might exercise "free rein"
in criminal matters for six months, or for a year, but his power extended
not one moment beyond the narrow temporal confines that had been
erected to protect the Italian city-states from tyranny.
Conclusion
The scholastic law of proof was not a mechanical response to the
abolition of ordeals in 1215. During the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries, canonists and civilians engaged in a spirited debate about
the role of discretion in the administration of criminal law. The conflict
was, at its base, one that is familiar to modem jurists: efficiency calls
for ever-greater judicial discretion in the interest of protecting society
from criminals, while individualized justice demands strict adherence
to the hallowed rules of law that guarantee "due process."3 3 In the
medieval debate, as in its modem counterpart, neither argument was
able to drive its competitor completely from the field. Both the scholarly
works of the medieval jurists and the statutory enactments of the Italian
communes reflected an attempt to adhere to the solemnities of the law
and, at the same time, to escape the strictures of an evidentiary law
that would have required two witnesses' testimony or confession by
the accused to sustain a conviction. Jurists and urban legislators
circumvented the two-witness rule by adopting three expedients. Civil
jurists, such as Bartolus, used pure juristic interpretation, citing the
texts of the classical Roman law that permitted circumstantial proof,
using them to argue that proof by indicia satisfied the principle that
proof in a criminal case had to be "clearer than the light of day." This
interpretation implied the existence of an alternative standard for
sufficient proof: Bartolus suggested that the judge's subjective certainty
beyond a doubt was the applicable standard of proof. The canonists
used an entirely new form of criminal procedure, per notorium, that
did not require full, formal proof in cases of notorious crime. The
legislators used statutes to trump the strict law of proof. Some city-
states granted their magistrates broad discretion that permitted criminal
judges to ignore most of the technicalities of pleading and proof. Some
statues authorized conviction upon proof to some lesser standard, such
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as fama plus the testimony of a single witness, but usually in specific
cases, such as those involving only monetary penalties.
Upon consideration of these varieties of the law of proof, it seems
fair to conclude that the rule requiring two witnesses or a confession
for a "full proof" did not exercise the kind of absolute hegemony that
legal historians have attributed to it. The two-witness rule was an
important touchstone, but it did not dominate legal thinking or actual
practice so far as to prevent the cultivation of alternative forms of
proof.
This unexpected flexibility in the rules governing proof raises some
questions about the relationship between the law of proof and the
emergence of judicial torture. If the jurists and the legislators of the
city-states found it easy to escape the two-witness standard of proof,
then they cannot have seized upon judicial torture as the only device
capable of producing the one acceptable alternative, that is, confession.
Although the rise of judicial torture lies beyond the scope of this essay,
it is clear that the reasons for its emergence must have been more
complex than the impracticality of the two-witness rule. In the 1270s,
for example, Albertus Gandinus. saw judicial torture as an effective
exemplary and punitive device, even though it occurred at the inves-
tigative stage of the inquisitorial process. It is also likely that there was
a class bias in the use of torture, which operated to the disadvantage
of the poor and the disenfranchised. Finally, one suspects that torture
was adopted most rapidly in the prosecution of crimes that combined
a nefarious quality with being virtually impossible to prove by any
means other than confession. The Church's campaign against heresy,
and the communes' equally fervent campaign against treason and
sedition, probably explain the rise of investigative torture better than
a theory of the inadequacy of the law of proof. The prosecution of
crimes committed in the heart and mind led to the employment of
devices that could investigate them while breaking the defendant's will
to resist.
The emergence ofjudicial torture as an everyday aspect of inquisitorial
process was more gradual than Langbein would suggest, and its use
was functionally and demographically bimodal. If we can believe
Gandinus, in the latter part of the thirteenth century, the man of ill
fame and low condition, without respectable social connections, prob-
ably faced the prospect of punitive, or exemplary, torture that bore
only a nominal relationship to the investigation of a particular crime.
On the other hand, the socially respectable defendant probably faced
a realistic possibility of being tortured only if charged with disloyalty
to orthodox Christianity or to the state. The accuracy of these specu-
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lations will not be known until archival research establishes who was
actually tortured in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and for
what crimes.
On a more general level, this essay concerns legal evolution. Tradi-
tionally, one approach has stressed the intellectual, rational aspect of
law, interpreting legal change as the unfolding of a reasoned ordering
of rules and procedures. Robert Bartlett's recent study of ordeals
exemplifies this approach: he maintains that the abolition of ordeals
resulted from "the doubts and debates of an intellectual elite."3 4 An
opposing approach has developed among social and economic histo-
rians. They see the development of legal rules as a reaction to, rather
than as a creative force behind, social developments. Paul Hyams spoke
for this point of view when he argued that "legal change seldom
emerged directly from positive, public decisions motivated by a driving
desire for a higher rationality. Perhaps it never does." '3 5
The development of the law of proof in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries suggests that neither of these approaches standing alone
provides an adequate explanation of the evolution of legal systems.
Alan Watson's general theory of legal evolution is more satisfactory
than Bartlett's or Hyams's particular theories about the disappearance
of the ordeal.316 The scholastic jurists used their professional discipline,
their learning and skills, to mediate the tensions between the intellectual
structure of the ius commune and the rapidly changing social perception
of crime. Their conservative jurisprudence preserved the integrity and
mythic significance of the authoritative legal sources, the mastery of
which constituted the jurists' monopoly of expertise, while their in-
novative maneuvers permitted the adaptation of legal rules to pressing
social needs. In the law of proof, this mediation involved both the
preservation of rules that enshrined values and beliefs about fairness,
and the interpretation of those rules to permit the efficient prosecution
of crime. The law of proof, therefore, moved in response to the doubts
and debates of an intellectual elite, but also in response to the perceived
needs of society as they arose in immediate cases and contexts.
The medieval debate about judicial discretion was not merely an
academic squabble about the fine points and technicalities of criminal
procedure. As one reads the jurists' writings, the social and political
concerns of the ecclesiastical reformers and the ruling elites of the
Italian city-states keep reappearing in the mainstream of the legal
debate. There is a temptation for academics, immersed in the learned
tomes of scholastic jurisprudence, to become more scholastic than the
medieval jurists were. It is important not to emphasize the neat pigeon-
holes of legal doctrine so completely that we forget that legal debate,
Law and History Review
then as now, reflected and responded to social context and social
process.
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per maiorem partem.
71. Ibid.: Considerandum est quod sit factum de quo dicitur esse fama. Nam si
tale sit sive ita magnum, quod per famam ab omnibus de civitate... scilicet a maiori
parte ipsorum sciri debuerit vel sciri soleat, tunc non sufficit esse famam de facto
predicto in aliqua contrata civitatis... Puta D. Brancallo et D. Castellanus de Andalotis
olim fuerint senatores urbis Romane. Nunc est questio in civitate Bononie si fuerint
senatores vel non. Ad probationem fame sufficit probare famam esse, de hoc quod
fuerunt senatores urbis Romane, in quarterio Porte S. Proculi vel in contrata ipsorum?
Certe non. The example is historically accurate. The degli Andalo were a Bolognese
family of professional podesta. Brancaleone degli Andalo, Count of Casalecchio, was
senator of the Romans from 1252 to 1254 and from 1254 to 1258. Pullan, History of
Early Renaissance Italy, 123-24.
72. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus defama: Si vero duo populares fuerunt potestates
aliquarum villarum civitatis Bononie, tunc sit questio super hoc. Nonne sufficeret ad
famam probandam probare de hoc esse famam in contrata ipsorum? Certe sic.
73. Ibid.: Si questio sit de offensione facta alicui de maioribus civitatis, propter
quam offensionem fuit magnus rumor in civitate Bononie, partes forte fecerunt
tumultum et ad bellum se preparaverunt, si probatur famam esse de aliquo quod
dictam offensionem fecerit, certe non sufficit probare famam esse de hoc in aliqua
contrata. Immo probari oportet famam esse per civitates et loca similia. Si de offensione
facta alicui parvo populari agitur, et fama sit probanda, sufficit probare famam contrate,
et sic de similibus. Thomas's examples illustrate once more the ubiquitous theme of
factional strife leading to violence.
74. Cf. X.5.1.24, in which Innocent III asserted thatfama had to arise from providis
et honestis, and not from malevolis et maledicis; X.3.2.8, in which Innocent taught
that a cleric's cohabitation with a woman could be brought before the cleric's superiors
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on the basis of informal complaints of "good men" among whom the cleric had his
abode.
75. Thomas followed a fashion dating back at least as far as Isidore of Seville's
Etymologies. Like many of the scholastics' linguistic ventures, Thomas's etymological
speculations were ludicrous. He claimed that the word fama was derived from the
phrase fides mentis (with fa- standing for fides and -ma standing for mentis), meaning
"mental belief"
76. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama: Et quidem probatur [fama] per duos
testes... nisi iudici constet de dicta fama, quia sit nota sibi ut notoria.
77. The canonistic definition of notorium was expressed in X.3.2.7 and X.3.2.8,
under the title "On the cohabitation of clerics with women." The canonists' glosses to
these decretals provided the basis for scholastic discussions of notorium, manifestum,
fama, occultum, and related concepts. Cf. Bartolus, In ius universum civile commentaria,
Dig. 48.16.6.3: Tractatum de notoriis criminibus non habemus in iure nostro, sed
canonistes habent tractatum longum.
78. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus defama: Si dicat "nescio," vel si dicat quod hoc
audivit a tali et a tali, vel a x vel xx hominibus, non valet dictum ipsius aliquid.
79. Ibid.: Unde sapientes tabelliones querunt a teste deponente super fama, quid
est fama; item quod homines faciunt famam; item unde habuit originem fama de quo
deponit... Sed quid si respondeat testis interrogatus de origine fame, "nescio unde
habuit originem?" Puto quod bene respondeat.
Si queratur a teste, "quomodo scis?", debet respondere quia ita sentit maior pars
populi civitatis....
80. Ibid.: Si vero respondeat testis "originem habuit fama ab ipso facto de quo
agitur vel de quo est fama,' puto responsionem optimam. Nam factum potest hominibus
esse certum....
81. J. Mansfield, "Jury Notice," Georgetown Law Journal 74 (1985): 395; R. Fraher,
"Adjudicative Facts, Non-Evidence Facts, and Permissible Jury Background Informa-
tion," Indiana Law Journal 62 (1986): 333.
82. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus defama: Sed quid operabitur fama probata, cum
agitur ex contractu et petitur aliquid ex promissione, et probatur famam esse quod ille
a quo petitur illud promisit? Vel quid si agatur rei vendicatione vel simili actione, et
probatur famam esse quod res petita sit petentis? Vel agitur civiliter ex quacunque
causa et actoris intentio approbatur per famam, nec probatur aliquid aliud?... fama
sola non probat in casibus supradictis.
83. Ibid.: Et quidem fama probata aliquando operatur et habet effectum ut valet
contractus celebratus cum aliquo, ut sic condemnari possit exceptione cessante, que
alias si non probaretur.
84. Ibid.: lila fama locum habet si mutuo filiofamilias de quo fama sit quod sit
paterfamilias. Nam si pecuniam receptam ab ipso repetam et ipse nunc exceptionem
opponat, et ego probavero famam fuisse tempore dati mutui quod est paterfamilias,
cessabit exceptio supradicta et condemnabitur cum effectu.
85. Ibid.: Nam si fuero in iudicio cum filiofamilias sine consensu patris, cum esset
fama quod dictus filiusfamilias esset paterfamilias, tenebit iudicium, quia in iudiciis
quasi contrahitur... sed si non fuisset dicta fama nec probaretur, nec instantia iudicii
nec sententia valeret regulariter.
86. Ibid.: Sic operatur circa iudicium, quod valeat iudicium et sententia et arbitrium,
instantia et acta omnibus alicuius, ut si de iudice vel arbitro vel tabellione erat fama
quod esset liber, et erat servus.
87. Ibid.: Sed in dictis casibus fama probata reddit id de quo agitur validum.
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88. Ibid.: Sed quid operabitur fama probata, cum agitur ex contractu et petitur
aliquid ex promissione, et probatur famam esse quod ille a quo petitur illud promisit?
89. Ibid.: Illud enim quod petitur ex contractu probari debet per testes qui de
veritate et sua scientia testimonium perhibeant.
90. Ibid.: Fama sola non probat in casibus supradictis.
91. Ibid.: ... verum est quod consentiens fama confirmat fidem rei de qua queritur
quando preter famam sunt alie probationes. Que si quidem sint plene et sufficientes
probant per se sine fama, nihilominus confirmat fama ibidem si non erant omni
exceptione maiores, quod esse debent.
92. See C. Donahue, "Proof by Witnesses in the Church Courts of Medieval England:
An Imperfect Reception of the Learned Law" in On the Laws and Customs of England,
ed. Arnold et al., 143-55.
93. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus defama: Multitudo testium facit additamentum
quoddam ad probationem faciendam per eos, que non fieret si non esset multitudo
ipsorum, quia non erant omni exceptione maiores, et sic confirmat probationem
faciendam per eos.
94. Ibid.: In secundo casu dignitas testium operatur, quod plenam faciant probati-
onem quam non fecerent alias, cum forte non essent omni exceptione maiores vel quia
erant amici producentis vel simili ratione, et sic dignitas testium supplet quod alios
deficeret et confirmat probationem faciendam per eos.
95. Ibid.: Nam presumptione iuris non vivit homo ultra centum annos, cui statur
nisi contrarium doceat.
96. Accursius, glossa ordinaria to Dig. 22.5.3 v. Confirmat: Dicitur fama confirmare,
idest cum alio firmare: non quod per se fama non sufficiat; sed respectu assertionis
partis, quam assertionem fama confirmat. Sufficit ergo per se.
97. Ibid.: Sufficit ergo per se ... secundum loan.
98. Ibid.: Alii dicunt, quando consonant naturae, ut B. mortuum, et propter hoc
dicit hic "alias consentiens;' idest quandoque; sed alias non sufficit famam probare.
99. Ibid.: Alii dicunt quod [fama] cum alio firmat... Facit ergo secundum hos
probationem semiplenam.
100. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama: Respondetur et inducetur in argu-
mentum quod fama dicitur confirmare, non quod per se non sufficiat absque alia
probatione, sed respectu assertionis partis, quam assertionem fama confirmat, et ita
sufficit pro se absque alia probatione, allegauit dominus Accursius... et scriptum est
in apparatu Accursii, posito in dicto paragrapho "Alias numerus" preter predicta
"secundum lo.," quasi lo. predicta dixerit et conscripserit. Sed loan. excludo, quod
predicta non scripsit, non dixit. Immo dixit totum contrarium, quod fama sola non
probat in casibus supradictis, et hoc puto ipsam veritatem, quod fama probata in
casibus supradictis non probat.
101. Ibid.: Non tamen per hoc sentio quod fama obtineat medietatem plene
probationis.
102. Ibid.: Item quid operatur fama in maleficiis, ut puta accusatur quis de homicidio
vel alio crimine, accusator non probat aliud nisi famam et vocem publicam esse quod
accusatus aliquod maleficium commiserit de quo accusatus est, numquid ex tali
probatione erit condemnandus?
103. Ibid.: In criminali enim debent esse probationes luce clariores.
104. The Fourth Lateran Council's decree Qualiter et quando had authorized
prosecution by ex officio inquisition whenever "a clamor arose that could not be
ignored without scandal or tolerated without danger" to law and order. Gandinus,
Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric Quomodo de maleficiis cognoscatur per inquisitionem,
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explained that Qualiter et quando had established six prerequisites to inquisitio: public
outcry and fama that the suspect had committed the crime; personal jurisdiction over
the suspect; a judge's awareness of the infamia; that the outcry not be a single instance,
but a constant or repeated phenomenon; that the fama have arisen among honest and
discreet persons; and that the fama not have arisen from malice, but out of a zeal for
justice. If an inquisitio were undertaken against a particular individual, Gandinus
believed that the procedural rules of Qualiter et quando should be followed, although
a generalis inquisitio, or an investigation of a crime without a particular suspect, could
be undertaken without any fama.
105. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama: Queritur quid operabitur fama in
maleficiis? Respondeo quod confirmabit alias probationes aliorum testium qui non
sunt omni exceptione maiores, ut supra dixi in causis civilibus.
106. Ibid.: Sed numquid operabitur [fama], ut torqueri possit accusatus secundum
iura communia?
107. Ibid.: Nam ad veritatem maleficii inveniendi torqueri potest accusatus...
precedentibus tamen indiciis. A questionibus enim inchoandum non est, nisi precedant
indicia sive argumenta.
108. Ibid.: Ex indicio vero non proceditur secundum iura communia ad questiones,
sed ex indiciis.
109. Ibid.: ut puta dictum unius testis... vel si constaret accusatum esse inimicum
accusatoris... Idem si se iactasset accusatus de maleficio committendo... Idem si
visus fuisset accusatus fugere de loco maleficii tempore maleficii commissi... Idem si
alias maleficium perpetrasset in personam illius qui nunc dicitur offensus vel etiam
alterius, quia qui semel fuit malus et nunc presumitur malus.
110. G. Fasoli and P. Sella, eds., Statuti di Bologna dell' Anno 1288, Bk. 4, rubric
17: De tondolo et tormento: Ordinamus quod nullus possit vel debeat modo aliquo vel
ingenio tormentari ... nisi in casibus infrascriptis...
11. Ibid.: Et in quolibet predictorum casuum cum violente presumptiones invente
fuerint.
112. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus defama: Scio tamen quod Italici utuntur hoc
vocabulo, quia dicunt quod est presumptio violenta, unde dicit lex municipalis Bononie
quod nullus ponatur ad torculum sive tormentum nisi in certis casibus in quibus potest
quis poni, videlicet si sint contra eum presumptiones violente. Que ergo dicantur
violente presumptiones? Respondeo magna indicia, que sunt minus indiciis indubitatis
et plus indiciis simplicibus. For a more refined discussion of violent presumptions, see
Innocent III, In V Lib. Decretalium Commentaria (Venice, 1610) at X.2.23.10 v.
verosimile. Innocent claimed that violentae presumptiones constituted a sufficient basis
for a condemnation, but cautioned that a judge should only rarely use such presumptions
as proof and should mollify the penalty in such a case.
113. In the inaugural oath of the Bolognese podesta, Statuti di Bologna, Bk. 1, rubric
5, the magistrate laid claim to unfettered discretion except as regards torture: ... et in
his inquirendis habeam purum, merum, et liberum arbitrium, salvo semper ... statuto
quod loquitur de tondolo et tormento. In contrast, the Florentine statutes of the early
fourteenth century gave the podest& and the capitano del popolo broad discretion to
torture suspects who fled: ... habeant arbitrium et liberam potestatem et teneatur cogere
et ad tormenta ponere et omni alia via qui eis vel alteri eorum videbitur investigare
quoscunque... qui pro eorum ministeriis publicis consueverunt recipere pecun-
iam... aufugientes et se absentes... Sed quando et quantum ponantur ad tormenta
vel alia via tormentorum procedatur sit in arbitrio Potestatis et Capitanei qui tunc
fuerint. Statuto del Capitano del Popolo, 1322-1325 (Florence, 1910), Bk. 2, rubric 25.
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For plenum et liberum arbitrium involving fraudulent behavior in litigation concerning
debt, see ibid., Bk. 2, rubric 28. Bk. 3, rubric 2 authorized the capitano to prosecute
and convict anyone who attempted to corrupt a public official, and specifically
established a lesser standard of proof: et sufficiat probatio per publica fama. In other
criminal matters involving values of less than ten Florentine pounds, the statutes
permitted the Capitano to proceed summarily, relying on proof by a single witness: et
sufficiat probatio per unum testem. Bk. 2, rubric 1.
114. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama: Et ideo dixi "secundum iura com-
munia" sive Romana, quod quando lex municipalis determinat quando sit ad tormenta
procedendum, per potestatem vel iudicem secundum illam legem municipalem est
procedendum et non aliter.
115. Ibid.: Et ideo dixi "secundum iura communia sive Romana" quia quando
potestas habet arbitrium, etiam si non essent indicia plura sed unum tantum, posset
ad tormenta procedere.
116. Ibid.: ... quia dare arbitrium potestati nihil aliud est quam dicere quod bona
fide procedat, ut sibi placuerit et ut sua conscientia sibi dictaverit.
117. Nrr, Zur Stellung des Richters.
118. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus defama: Nam arbitrium supradictum potestati
vel iudici dat largas habenas, et hoc vult arbitrii interpretatio.
119. Ibid.: Unde cum datur arbitrium potestati, non dicat quis ad boni viri arbitrium
reducendum arbitrium potestatis vel condemnatio ab eo factum. Aliud enim est privatos
compromittere in arbitratores, quo casu arbitrium reduci debet ad arbitrium boni
viri... Aliud est per legem municipalem vel reformationem populi sive decurionum
dari arbitrium potestati, quo casu per arbitrium habet potestas quod dixi.
120. Ibid.: Item quid possit facere potestas sive iudex ex tale arbitrio sibi dato,
potius capitur ex consuetudine terrarum quam ex iure.
121. Ibid.: ... quia quando potestas habet arbitrium, etiam si non essent indicia
plura sed unum tantum, posset ad tormenta procedere.
122. Ibid.: Item licet in procedendo et in maleficium cognoscendo possint omittere
ordinem et solemnitatem iuris ex consuetudinaria et communi interpretatione arbitrii,
non tamen prorsus non possunt vel debent omittere.
123. Ibid.: Item et cum ad sententiam pervenerint, caveant ne ratione arbitrii
condemnent ex sola conscientia, vel ex sola fama, vel ex dicto unius testis, sed si
inveniant probatum maleficium tunc condemnent.
124. Ibid.: Idem si non sit omnino plene probatum, sed si ad probationem plenam
ad modicum deficiat, forte ratione testium qui non sint omni exceptione maiores, nam
tunc condemnent secure per arbitrium quod habent, si tamen conscientia et animus
cum probatione concurrit.
125. Ibid.: Tenetur enim potestas qui habet arbitrium de dolo et lata culpa, iudicio
meo, ut depositarius.
126. Ibid.: Sed quid si maleficium est probatum per unum testem omni exceptione
maiorem, item per famam et vocem publicam, numquid poterit condemnare potestas?
Respondeo quod non, secundum iura Romana et communia... Ex arbitrio tamen
quod habet potestas bene poterit condemnare, et bona fide videtur procedere si
condemnet.
127. Ibid.: Nec propter hoc intelligo plene probatum, quia famam non puto facere
dimidium probationis plene.
128. Ibid.: Quis sit effectus indicii? Et certe iosius effectus est, ut moveat animus
iudicis ad credendum accusatum de maleficii commississe maleficium.
129. Ibid.: Ista verto indicia aut sunt ad probationem indubitata aut sint dubitata.
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Primo casu, quando sunt ad probationem indubitata, tune ex iis proceditur ad
sententiam condemnatoriam.
130. They were quoted by Albertus Gandinus, adapted by Bartolus of Saxoferrato,
recited by Angelus Aretinus, who attributed them to Bartolus, only to be caught by
Girolamo Giganti, who corrected the attribution and rejected the legal doctrine
articulated by Thomas de Piperata. Finally, Thomas's three cases were quoted verbatim,
without attribution, in Jacobus de Bellovisu's Practica criminalia, rubric De questionibus
et qualitate tormentorum nos. 78-81.
131. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus defama: Est camera habens unum aditum et
exitum, et non plures. De dicta camera exiit sive egreditur aliquis pallidus, cum gladio
sanguinolento in manibus. Statim post eius exitum invenitur in dicta camera homo
occisus cum gladio. Ista certa sunt indicia ad probationem maleficii indubitati.
It seems that Thomas de Piperata had never seen a thirteenth-century predecessor
of Perry Mason establish a client's innocence, despite the client's having been caught
with a "smoking revolver" in his hand, while kneeling over the body of his slain
enemy.
132. Ibid.: Raro tamen inveniuntur talia indicia, unde subiciamus aliud exemplum
de indiciis ad probationem indubitatis que de facto possent venire.
133. Ibid.: Ecce, occiditur Titius in aliqua vinea vel fundo. Accusatus est Seius,
quod dictum Titium interfecerit. Nulli testes deponunt quod Seius occiderit eurn, sed
probatur hoc, videlicet quod Seius erat inimicus Titii. Item dicunt testes quod viderunt
Seium admenantem cum gladio contra Titium. Item probatur per testes quod Seius
fugit tempore dicti maleficii de loco in quo fuit commissum dictum maleficium. Item
probatur vox et fama quod dictus Seius occiderit istum Titium.
134. Ibid.: Certe omnia ista iuncta simul, etsi singula per se non sufficiant, vel duo
ex eis, que tamen sunt quattuor, quorum quilibet indicat dictum Seium predictum
maleficium commississe, bene probant Seium occidisse dictum Titium.
135. Ibid.: Ecce aliud exemplum: Accusatur aliquis, puta Seius, quod Titium fecit
occi. Non sunt testes qui hoc dicent, sed probatur hoc contra Seium, videlicet quod
erat inimicus Titii. Item quod dictus Seius tempore maleficii perpetrati erat prope
locum maleficii. Item quod dictus Seius perpetrato homicidio receptavit homicidam.
Item quod homicida erat domesticus et familiaris Seii. Item quod Seius iactabat se,
quod faceret dictum Titium occi, et est homo de quo verosimilie sit quod hoc faceret,
et hoc facere possit. Item quod olim alique offensiones-facte fuerunt inter predictos
Titium et Seium.
136. Ibid.: Ista certe satis videntur facere indicia indubitata quod ille Seius fecerit
occidi predictum Titium.
137. Cf. Sarti and Fattorini, De claris... professoribus 2:53, no. 32, in which
"Thomaxium domini Peverarii" appears as a jurisconsult and "domino Gandino
judice" appears as a witness.
138. Gandinus, Tractatus de rnaleficiis, preface: Circa cuius libelli correctionem et
continentiam talem intendo ordinem observare: ante omnia premittendo, quod de
maleficiis cognoscitur quinque modis, videlicet per accusationem, per denuntiationem,
per inquisitionem et exceptionem, et quando crimen est notorium.
139. Ibid., rubric Quomodo de maleficio cognoscitur, quando crimen est notorium §
4: Notorium vero facti habetur id crimen, in quo fama suum prebet adminiculum et
ipsa evidentia rei protestatur, quod se prebet et se exhibet conspectui hominum omnium
vel maioris partius alicuius loci, ut nulla possit tergiversatione celatur, ut extra de
cohabitatione clericorum et mulierum c. Tua et c. Vestra et c. fin. Gandinus quoted
verbatim from the decretals that he cited.
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140. Ibid., rubric Quid sit fama: Restat nunc videre, quo modo cognoscitur, quando
crimen est notorium. Sed quoniam fama, infamia, presumptiones et indicia sunt
precedentia cognitionem dicti notorii criminis, et etiam quoniam pro investigatione et
cognitione criminum plurimum operantur, ideo de eis omnibus videamus.
141. Ibid., rubrics Quid sit fama; Unde aut a quo loco possit fama procedere, A quo
vel a quibus personis possit fama incipere et ex quo tempore; Qualis et quantus sit fame
effectus; De presumptionibus et indiciis dubitatis, quibus proceditur ad tormenta; De
presumptionibus et indiciis indubitatis, ex quibus condemnatio possit sequi; De rumore,
de occulto, et de manifesto.
142. Ibid., rubric Quid sit fama § 1: Equidem fama est inlese dignitatis status,
moribus et legibus comprobatus, et in nullo diminutus.
143. Ibid., rubric De presumptionibus et indiciis indubitatis, ex quibus condemnatio
possit sequi.
144. Ibid., § 1: Sed licet ex ea sola probatione, que iuris est tantum, aliquis non
possit vel debeat corporaliter diffinitive damnare, tamen ex ea sola presumptione, que
iuris est et de iure, et ex quolibet alio indicio indubitato poterit contra aliquem
diffinitiva formari sententia, quia talis presumptio, qui iuris est et de iure, probationem
aliquam in contrarium non admittit... Item ex quolibet indicio indubitato poterit
diffinitiva formari sententia ... et merito, quia illa lege ultima (scil. Cod. 4.19.25)
cavetur, quod accusatores eam rem, hoc est illud crimen, habent et debent in publicam
notionem deferre, ut possit diffinitiva proferri sententia, quod crimen idoneis testibus
sit munitum, saltim duobus... vel quod sit apertissimis documentis instructum... vel
quod sit instructum indiciis ad probationem indubitatis, clarioribus luce expedita.
145. Ibid.: Et circa presentem materiam primo intendo formare quandam dubita-
bilem questionem, que tota die de facto potest subsistere.
146. Ibid.: Questio talis est. Quidam nomine Titius in domo vel agro reperitur
occisus vel vulneratus, de malefactore autem aliter non constat, nisi quia quidam
nomine Seius de dicto maleficio inculpatur; contra hunc Seium ista probantur per
testes idoneos omni exceptione maiores: primo, quod publica vox et fama est ab idoneis
orta personis, quod dictus Seius dictum maleficium commisit; secundo, quod ipse erat
illius Titii capitalis inimicus; tertio, quod ille Seius visus fuit solus exire domum vel
agrum Titii, cum gladio evaginato in manu fugere, in qua domo vel agro ille Titius
repertus est occisus incontinenti vel vulneratus. Modo queritur, numquid ista omnia
indicia simul iuncta et commixta sint et dici possint indicia indubitata, ex quibus
possit ad condemnationem procedi?
147. Ibid.: Et primo videtur posse dici, quod sic, triplici ratione: prima quia sicut
sufficit, quod quis sit testibus superatus vel propria voce confessus, ad hoc, ut possit
capitalis sententia contra eum proferri... ita eodem modo debebit ex dictis contra
eum repertis sententia proferri, cum talia indicia non respuantur a iure... et cum talia
indicia non videantur continere minorem auctoritatem et fidem probationis, quam
testes vel instrumenta (citing Cod. 4.19.21 and Cod. 3.32.19)... Item tam testes quam
aperta indicia et manifesta equiparantur, ut possit sequi diffinitiva sententia (citing
Cod. 4.19.25).
148. Ibid.: Secunda ratione: quia quotiens circa idem pluria auxilia eiusdem generis
ex eodem factor descendentia simul commixta et iuncta concurrunt, dicuntur rem
perficere et plenam probationem adducere ... sic et a simili supradicta indicia simul
coniuncta plenam probationem inducunt, ideo quod singula, que non prosunt, tamen
simul iuncta coadiuvunt...
,149. Ibid.: Tertia ratione, quia in qualibet civili causa regulariter due semiplene
probationes faciant unam plenam et possit causa civilis per indicia et presumptiones
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probari... Plus tamen valere debent et operari tria vel pluria auxilia quam duo. Nam
ratio consistit, ut plus tribus quam duobus credatur. Pluralitati enim standum est... Ergo
per locum a proportione maiori tria indicia seu tres semiplene probationes unam
plenam probationem poterunt operari. Alioquin facile et frequenter remanerent maleficia
impunita, quod in contrarium magna ratio suadet.
For the force of this argument, see Fraher, "Theoretical Justification for the New
Criminal Law of the High Middle Ages:' 577-95.
150. Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric De presumptionibus et indiciis in-
dubitatus: Quarta ratione... Reperitur in iure, quod ipsa principalis causa criminalis
per argumenta et per presumptiones dignoscitur et terminatur, quamquam liquido
delictum probari non possit, ut if. de re militari 1. Non omnes § A barbaris, (Dig.
49.16.5.6) ibi: "et si hoc liquido probari non possit, argumentis tamen cognoscendum
est,' et tamen ibi capitalis causa agebatur.
151. Ibid.: E contra, videtur dicendum quod non possit ex dictis indiciis et
presumptionibus diffinitive damnari, tribus rationibus. Prima, quia in civilibus ques-
tionibus maioribus una libra auri non minor quam trium testium exigatur probatio.
152. Ibid.: Multo fortius in qualibet criminali causa due vel tres presumptiones aut
indicia probationem non poterunt operari... maxime cum quelibet causa criminalis
sit maior qualibet pecuniaria ... tamen in criminali causa ex dictis semiplenis probat-
ionibus non erit quis diffinitive damnandus, quia in causa criminali probationes debent
esse apertissime ... Strictius enim in eis proceditur, cum circa hominis salutem agatur.
153. Ibid.: Secunda ratione, quia, licet evidentia rei habeatur pro quadam specie
probationis ... et etiam cum manifestum et apertur indicium habeatur aliquem
inveniri in crimine et fore detentum et captum... et manifesta non indigeant probat-
ione ... tamen propterea non debet quis ex talibus indiciis diffinitive damnari, nisi
aliter de maleficio convincatur, ut arg. ff. di ritu nuptiarum 1. Palam § Que in adulterio
(Dig. 43.2.23.12) et C. de defensoribus civitatum 1. Defensores (Cod. 1.55.8).
154. Ibid.: Potest tertia etiam ratio assignari, quoniam ex testibus, ex instrumentis,
ex indiciis indubitatis, non autem ex presumptione est diffinitiva sententia profer-
enda... In civili autem secus, ideo, quia in criminalibus causis maius periculum
vertitur, ideo quia imminet periculum anime ... Et in talibus dubiis et incertis pro-
bationibus melius est facinus inpunitum relinqui nocentis, quam innocentem damnare,
ut ff. de penis 1. Absentem (Dig. 48.19.5).
155. Ibid.: Solutio. Videtur, quod ex predictis indiciis possit colligi tantum iuris
presumptio contra predictum Seium ... Et quamvis in causa civili ex iuris tantum
presumptione possit diffinitiva sequi sententia... tamen in criminali causa vel in causa
questionis predicte ex tali presumptione iuris tantum non debebit vel poterit quis
damnari.
156. Ibid.: ... quia in criminalibus causis intervenire debent et requiruntur probat-
iones clariores luce ... Quod videtur ea ratione procedere, quia in causis criminalibus
perspicacius est consilium adhibendum, quia ibi maius periculum et detrimentum
contingit.
157. Ibid.: Sed licet ex ea sola probatione, que iuris est tantum, aliquis non possit
vel debeat corporaliter diffinitive damnari, tamen ex ea sola presumptione, que iuris
est et de iure, et ex quolibet alio indicio indubitato poterit contra aliquem diffinitiva
formari sententia... Item ex quolibet indicio indubitato poterit diffinitiva formari
sententia, ut C. de probationibus 1. ult (Cod. 4.19.25), et merito, quia illa lege ultima
cavetur quod accusatores earn rem, hoc est illud crimen, habent et debent in publicam
notionem deferre, ut possit diffinitiva proferri sententia, quod crimen idoneis testibus
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sit munitum, saltim duobus, ... vel sit apertissimis documentis instructum... vel quod
sit instructum indiciis ad probationem indubitatis, clarioribus luce expedita.
158. Ibid., § 6: Quartum habetur indicium indubitatum, quotiens constat, quod
crimen, quod adversus aliquem oritur, ita est publicum et manifestum, ut merito possit
et debeat notorium appellari, quo casu nec testes requiruntur nec etiam accusator.
159. Ibid., § 4: Secundum est indicium indubitatum, quando constat, quod aliquis
in iudicio de crimine sponte sit confessus vel in tormentis et perseveraverit.
160. Ibid., § 3: Primum est indubitatum, quotiens contra aliquem est iuris et de
iure presumptio.
For example, suppose that a man and woman have successfully defended their
marriage against a challenge that the union was invalid on the ground of the couple's
alleged consanguinity. Subsequently, the wife is charged with adultery. Her husband
now claims to be her blood-relative because husbands are legally liable for failure to
accuse an unfaithful wife, while a woman's kin have no responsibility to accuse her.
The husband's claim to be the woman's blood relation is precluded by the legal
presumption arising from the prior legal determination that they were man and wife.
161. Ibid., § 7: Est etiam et quintum indubitatum indicium propter evidentiam et
qualitatem facti.
For example, if the physical evidence established that the victim of an assault had
lost an eye in the attack, the injury was "atrocious," and the assault became what we
would call aggravated assault. Or again, according to Gandinus, if someone drew a
sword against someone, or wounded someone, or killed someone, the very evidence
of the fact established mens rea (quod hoc dolo fecerit et ex sua animi pravitate et
ideo puniendus).
162. Ibid., §§ 9, 10, and 11.
163. Ibid., § 12: Ex predictis vero tribus indiciis ... scripsit dominus Thomas de
Piperata posse ad condemnatione procedi.... Sed omnes sapientes, quos Bononie vidi
et alibi, dicunt, et etiam vidi de consuetudine observari, quod propter talia vel similia
non possit quis diffinitive in persona damnari.
164. Ibid.: At si ex maleficio, ex quo essent talia indicia, deberet sequi pecuniaria
pena, habeat potestas arbitrium vel non, posset locum habere quod scripsit dictus
dominus Thomas... et ita vidi sepius observari.
165. Ibid.: Illud tamen in summa notandum est, quod omnia predicta indicia, de
quibus habetur mentio... non adeo indubitata dicuntur, quin adversus ea non possit
probari contrarium, preter quam in casu ubi est iuris et de iure presumptio contra
aliquem de delicto... quoniam nihil est adeo indubitatum, quin quandam solitam
dubitationem recipiat.
166. P Pazzaglini, The Criminal Ban of the Sienese Commune, Studi Sienesi vol.
45 (1979), 6, suggests that Gandinus's generation advocated "stiffer fines for the rich
and harsher corporal punishments for the poor." Pazzaglini's book includes a transcrip-
tion of a Sienese criminal condemnation, dated December 16, 1225, in which a
defendant named Giordanellus was fined 200 lire for homicide and was placed under
a ban that was redeemable upon payment of 1000 lire. Pazzaglini also points out that
Siena resorted to discounting such large fines, and permitting convicted malefactors to
pay off their penalties at greatly reduced rates, when the commune desperately needed
funds for its defense. Ibid., 87.
167. Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric Quomodo de maleficio cognoscitur
quando crimen est notorium § 4: ... quod notorium facti est, quod commissum vel
factum non dubitatur a populo vel a maiore parte populi, ut dicit Ubertus de Bobbio.
168. Ibid.: Notorium vero facti habetur id crimen, in quo fama suum prebet
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adminiculum et ipsa evidentia rei ita protestatur, quod se prebet et se exhibet conspectui
hominum omnium vel maioris partis alicuius loci, ut nulla possit tergiversatione celari,
ut extra. de cohabitatione clericorum et mulierum c. Tua et c. Vestra et c. fin. (X.3.2.8,
7, and 10).
169. See the casus, laying out the facts of the case in the gloss to X.3.2.8.
170. See Gratian's Decretum, Causa 2 quaestio 1, for an example of where the
problem stood in 1140. I have treated this subject at greater length in "Preventing
Crime in the High Middle Ages."
171. Gloss at X.3.2.8: Nota quod in notoriis facti non est necessaria probatio.
172. Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric Quomodo de maleficio cognoscitur
quando crimen est notorium § 9: In iis que sunt notoria iudici et aliis... nec requiritur
actor vel denuntiatior, nec datur libellus, nec lis contestatur, nec iuratur de calumnia
vel de veritate dicenda, nec requiruntur testes nec aliqua probatio: immo tunc ordinem
iudiciorum non servare est secundum ordinem iuris procedere; citabitur tamen crim-
inosus ad sententiam audiendam.
173. Ibid., § 4: Unde dixit dominus Ubertus quod si quis aliquem in platea coram
omnibus interfecit, quod illud crimen non erit notorium, dicens quod potest esse quod
hoc crimen non constat iudici, quis accusatus coram eo infitiatur, et sic sit res dubia.
174. Ibid., § 9: ... iis que sunt notoria iudici et aliis, ut quia factum sunt presente
iudice et tot aliis qui sufficiant ad notorium facti...
175. Ibid., § 10: Si vero sit notorium aliis tantum et non iudici, tunc officialis seu
denuntians auditur sine inscriptione... et in hoc notorio requiritur probatio...
176. Ibid.:... quod sit factum in loco publico de die et tot presentibus, qui faciant
crimen esse notorium.
177. Ibid., § 11: Alii vero dicunt sufficere, si testes probant alterum de duobus: vel
crimen fore notorium vel se vidisse illud committi.
178. Pazzaglini, Criminal Ban of the Sienese Commune, 6, 87.
179. Gandinus, Tractatus de maieficiis, rubric De questionibus et tormentis § 37:
Sed pone quod homicidium vel aliud maleficium fore commissum tam occulte quod
de malefactore non constat; verum post aliquod tempus capitur quidam, contra quem
insurgit publica vox et fama de maleficio predicto et qui alias sit homo male conditionis
et fame.
180. Ibid. § 38: Postremo quero: ecce datum est potestati vel iudici liberum et
generale arbitrium inquirendi et puniendi maleficia et excessus; numquid potestas sine
aliquibus indiciis potest contra delatum de crimine procedere ad tormenta?
181. Ibid.: Videtur quod sic, quia dare arbitrium potestati nihil aliud est dicere,
nisi ut cum bona conscientia procedat, secundum quod eius conscientia dictaverit.
Nam arbitrium dat potestatibus largas habenas, et hec est huius arbitrii interpretatio.
182. Cf. K. Nbrr, Zur Stellung des Richters, passim.
183. Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric De questionibus et tormentis: Potest
itaque potestas et debet ex arbitrio ad tormenta procedere si aliquod aliud habeat
indicium, per quod animus eius moveatur quod inculpatus de crimine sit torquendus,
et non alias.
184. Ibid.: Nam licet in processu potestas possit ex suo arbitrio multa de iuris
solemnitate omittere, non tamen potest prorsus omittere.
185. Ibid.: Nam facti questio in arbitrio est iudicanlis, non autem iuris auctoritas,
ut ff. ad municipalem 1. Ordine § i. (Dig. 50.1.15.,pr.).
186 Ibid.: Verum in ferenda sententia caveant potestates, ne condemnent ex solo
arbitrio, conscientia, vel ex dicto unius testis vel ex sola fama, cum in ferenda sententia
debeant iura servare.
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187. Ibid.: Verum etiam, si maleficium non esset plene probatum, sed ad plenam
probationem modicum deficeret-forte ratione testium qui non essent omni exceptione
maiores-tunc potest potestas ex tali arbitrio condemnare secure, si eius conscientia
et animus cum probatione concordet.
188. Ibid.: Tenetur enim potestas, qui habet arbitrium, solum de dolo et lata culpa
ut depositarius.
189. Ibid., rubric De presumptionibus et indiciis indubitatis, § 12, text at n. 163.
190. Ibid., rubric De penis reorum § 8: Circa impositionem penarum diligenter
attende et nota, quod iudex non debet subito et inconsulto calore delatum punire.
191. Arbitrium was the product of a legislative act, either in the form of a statute
or in the form of a reformatio.
192. Cf. Gandinus's scrupulous parsing of the relevant passages of the Digest and
the Code. Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric De presumptionibus et indiciis indubitatis.
193. The notion that torture was a res fragilis became a juristic commonplace that
was transmitted into early modem literature on criminal procedure, such as Sebastian
Guazzini, Tractatus ad defensam inquisitorum, carceratorum, reorum, et condemna-
torum (Geneva, 1664). "But let judges be on their guard against resorting to torture
with facility, as it is an expedient which may prove fragile or perilous, and may play
false to truth, because some persons have such an incapacity for the endurance of pain
that they are more willing to lie than to suffer torments.' translated in H. C. Lea,
Torture (1973), 190.
194. Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric De questionibus et tormentis, proem.:
Et ut iudicibus immodice sevientibus freni quedam temperies adhibita videatur, primo
notanda sunt V. magistralia.
195. Ibid., rubric A quo vel a quibus possitfama incipere et ex quo tempore § 5: Sed
pone questionem, que sepe occurrit de facto. Aliquod delictum publicum vel privatum
commissum est in civitate... in personam alicuius; tempore vero illius delicti de
malefactore aliquo non patebat; post aliquot tamen dies criminis quidam ob causam
dicti criminis captus fuit et ductus ante tribunal iudicis de ipso maleficio cognoscentis,
qui captus et representatus erat alias homo male condicionis et fama; post hec sic acta
clamor insonuit, quod iste erat conscius et culpabilis de maleficio antedicto, de quo
crimine et maleficio nullus ante dictam captionem erat aliquatenus inculpatus; nunc
vero adversarii huius duo nituntur probare, unum quod iste alias homo male condicionis
est habitus et fame, aliud quod nunc per civitatem est clamor et fama publica contra
eum; que per duos idoneos testes probantur; est tamen incertum a quo auctore super
crimine contra eum processerit illa fama publica aut clamor. Queritur, numquid ex
talibus presumptionibus et indiciis possit iudex questionibus inquirere contra eum?
196. Ibid.: Ergo ut denotatus et male meritus hic, de quo queritur, non poterit ipsius
civitatis ... contra cuius mores commisit, pro se aliquod auxilium invocare, quia frustra
iuris civitatis implorat auxilium, qui contra illud commisit.
197. Ibid.: Sed licet incertum sit, quis illud maleficium commiserit, tamen, cum de
ipso detento et capto malum exemplum habeatur, dum se sua sponte constituit et se
fecit hominem male fame, videtur quod iudex ex officio suo et de bono regimine possit
de crimine occulto ad questiones procedere contra ilium.
198. Ibid.: Et ideo videtur quod iudex animadvertendo in eundem ut iniuriosum
et male meritum possit, ut terribilem se ostendens, de dicto crimine inquirere per
tormenta et maxime, ut publice aliis ad terrenda maleficia sit exemplum.
199. Statuti di Bologna dell'Anno 1288, ed. Fasoli and Sella, Bk. 4, rubric 17: De
tondolo et tormento.
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200. Pazzaglini, Criminal Ban of the Sienese Commune, 27, points out that the
procedure for summoning a criminal defendant varied according to his residence, his
civil status, and the severity of the crime. Similarly, the increasing use of severe corporal
sanctions and the escalation of monetary sanctions had more severe implications for
the impecunious defendant than for the wealthy or aristocratic suspect, who could
afford to wait in exile until the commune needed money badly enough to be willing
to commute the criminal ban in return for a modest payment. Ibid., 106. For the
fourteenth century, see G. Ruggiero, Violence in Early Renaissance Venice (1980), 95ff.,
suggesting that the working class tended to be law-abiding, while socially marginal
individuals, such as foreigners, were likely to be the victims of crime or of criminal
justice.
201. This is contrary to the arguments of Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof
J. P. Levy, La hierarchie des preuves dans le droit savant du moyen age (Paris, 1939);
idem, "Le problme de la preuve dans les droits savants du moyen age" in La Preuve:
17 Recueuils de la Soci&t6 Jean Bodin 137-67; and most recently Bartlett, Trial by
Fire and Water, 141, who repeats the contention that the ius commune forced the
jurists to devise a system of judicial torture as a means of securing convictions and
thus escaping the two-witness rule.
202. Classical Roman law had wrestled with the same problem. See Hadrian's
rescript to Valerius Verus, preserved at Dig. 22.5.3.2: "In short, all I can reply to you
is that a cognitio should not be tied at once to a single mode of proof You must judge
from your own conviction what you believe and what you find not proved:'
203. Traditionally, priests exercised complete discretion with regard to penances
imposed in the internal forum. Similarly, any ecclesiastical superior possessed the
discretionary authority to impose a purgatory oath on any of his subject clerics who
was suspected of wrongdoing. Although the ecclesiastical judge faced constraints about
imposing certain kinds of "ordinary" penalties upon convicted miscreants, "extraor-
dinary" penalties were discretionary. Finally, some canonists left it to the judge to
determine how many witnesses were required to make a crime notorious.
204. Fraher, "The Theoretical Justification for the New Criminal Law of the High
Middles Ages:' 578.
205. H. Maisonneuve, Etudes sur les origines de l'Inquisition 2d ed. (Paris, 1960);
Esmein, History of Continental Criminal Procedure, 80-81.
206. X.3.2.8.
207. Durantis, Speculum iudiciale, pars iii, rubric Quid sit occultum?
208. S. Kuttner, "Ecclesia de occultis non iudicat: Problemata ex doctrina poenali
decretistarum et decretalistarum a Gratiano usque ad Gregorium Papam IX," Actus
Congressus Juridici Internationalis Romae, 12-17 Novembris 1934 3: (1936) 225-46.
Cf. Durantis, Speculum iudiciale, pars iii, rubric Quid sit occultum? Occulta enim soli
Deo reservantur.
209 Durantis, Speculum iudiciale, pars iii, rubric Quid sit occultum? Dicitur pene,
idest quasi, occultum quia id pauci sciunt, puto duo vel tres-ita tamen quod probari
possit-vel etiam quinque.
210. See Hostiensis, Summa aurea (Venice, 1605) rubric De accusationibus, de-
nunciationibus, et inquisitionibus: Gratia exempli dico tibi quod hec sunt capitalia
crimina que depositionem inducunt: sacrilegium, homicidium, adulterium, fornicatio,
falsum testimonium, rapina, sub qua continetur usura, furtum, superbia, invidia,
avaritia, et si longo tempore teneatur iracundia, ebrietas si assidua sit ... item dilapi-
datio... duplex contumacia... simonia... et demum publica crimina.
211. Durantis, Speculum iudiciale, pars iii., rubric Quid sit manifestum: Est autem
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manifestum publica seu famosa proclamatio ex certa scientia et a certis autoribus
proveniens.
212. Decretum 2.1.15, 17, and 21 preserved texts from Pope Nicholas I, Pope
Stephan V, and St. Ambrose that supported this proposition.
213. Durantis, Speculum iudiciale, pars iii, rubric Quid sit manifestum: Licet aperta,
idest manifesta, sit adversariorum reprehensio, iudex tamen debet ordinem iuris servare.
Ex hoc probatur quod manifestum probari debet.
214. Ibid., rubric Quid sit notorium: Porro notorium facti est illud crimen in quo
fama publica suum prebet adminiculum et ipsa rei evidentia protestatur, ita se exhibens
omnium hominum vel maioris partis alicuius loci conspectui, ut nulla possit tergiv-
ersatione celari.
215. Ibid., rubric De notoris ... criminibus: Sed qualiter sciet iudex crimen alicuius
notorium fore si id negatur? Responsum, secundum Tancredum et Vincentium: Per
facti evidentiam si est illius loci habitator, quod verum est si fiat in conspectu eius
pro tribunali sedentis, et non alias.
216. Ibid., rubric Quid sit notorium: Tot enim debent adesse quod eorum presentia
faciat crimen notorium. Nec paucorum presentia, puta duorum vel trium vel v., sufficit
ad aliquid notorium faciendum... Immo requiritur totius vicinie noticia, et quod
omnes communiter crimen commissum fore acclament, secundum quosdam ... Alii,
ut Vincentius, dicunt quod sufficit scientia maioris partis eius... Quidam tamen, ut
loannes, dixerunt x. hominum scientia sufficere... Quidam etiam dixerunt, et forte
non male, quod arbitrio iudicis relinquitur quot homines faciant notorium, cum non
sit in iure expressum.
217. Ibid., rubric De notoriis... criminibus: Hodie autem valde officium iudicum
in hac inquisitione exuberat. Ipsi namque defensiones arctant, ut vere dici possit quod
eorum officium latissime patet... Nonnunquam enim hominem inauditum et inde-
fensum statim suspendunt. Sed certe quicquid fiat nulli est de iure legitima defensio
deneganda.
Joannes Andreae noted, in a marginal addition to this passage, that Durantis had
borrowed the text from Hostiensis.
218. Hostiensis, Summa aurea, rubric De exceptionibus: Quia cuilibet heretico et
cuilibet excommunicato reservatur legitima defensio, ergo quantumcumque criminosus
sit, potest defendere se.
219. Fraher, "Preventing Crime in the High Middle Ages'"
220. Hostiensis, Summa aurea, rubric De criminibus sine ordine puniendis: Secun-
dum leges et canones ad quemlibet iudicem pertinet excessus subditorum ... etiam
sine aliqua fama inquirere et punire. Hoc enim publice interest... Et proceditur in
his de piano, sine aliqua solemnitate, ita quod iudex malos expellat et bonos admittat,
alias in pecunia puniendo, aliquando corpus torquendo, vel excommunicando vel
suspendendo, prout viderit expedire, quia hec omnia arbitrio suo committo... et sicut
de facto servant iudices maxime seculares. Quicquid tamen facient in occultis, non
puto de rigore iuris, quod sit legitima defensio deneganda. Sed in notoriis, cum nec
possit haberi, legitima denegatur... Unde quantumcumque sit aliquis infamatus,
semper ei legitima defensio reservatur.
221. Hostiensis, Lectura in quinque Gregorii decretalium libros (Paris, 1512), com-
menting on X.3.2.8: vel dicas quod generaliter in quolibet notorio potest procedi sine
citatione et probationibus... sed melius est et tutius ut citatio fiat antequam proceditur,
nisi forte scandalum vel magnum periculum reipublice sit in mora.
222. Ibid.: Et secundum illos qui hoc asserunt, quandocumque aliquid negatur
notorium [esse], semper probandum est... et ubi tale notorium proponitur tanquam
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accessorium, non proceditur super principali quousque sit probatum. Sed hoc nihil
aliud est quam prolongare lites et circuitus inducere, unde dicendum est quod ubi non
est locus inficiationi, potest iudex procedere et delinquentem punire quantumcumque
inficietur. Et hoc est speciale in maleficiis, ne remaneant impunita.
223. Ibid.: Bonus enim iudex nihil arbitrio suo facit, sed vidit leges et iura, et sicut
audit et se habet veritas iudicat et discernit. In iudicando tamen magis debet esse cordi
custodia veritatis quam obedientia voluntatis.
224. T. Diplovatatius, De claris iuris consultis, 172, asserted that Durantis quoted
from Thomas's Tractatus defama in Durantis's Speculum iudiciale, rubric De notorio
crimine. Sarti and Fattorini, De claris... professoribus 2:224, expanded the image to
one of great reliance by Durantis upon Thomas. But a careful reading of the Speculum
iudiciale produces no indentifiable borrowing from Thomas's work.
225. Joannes Andreae, Additio ad Speculum iudiciale, rubric Quid sit fama v.
reprobatus:... et adverte mihi placet descriptio [scilicet fame] lacobi quia brevis.
Thomas enim dixit, etc.
226. Ibid., v. coarctemus:... est sciendum quod in tractatu de fama multa scripserit
Thomas de Piperata legum doctor, satis miscendo de indicio, argumento, et presump-
tione.
227. Andreae's summary of Thomas's tractatus appeared in ibid., v. veniens.
228. Pazzaglini, The Criminal Ban of the Sienese Commune, 12.
229. Durantis, Speculum iudiciale, rubric De contumacia accusati: Sed pone, A. fiat
accusatus de morte T., citatus non venit se defendere, propter quod bannitus est et
demum propter contumaciam condemnatus. Nunc captus est per curiam. Queritur an
debet mori, et videtur quod sic. Nam videtur esse condemnatus ... Debet enim propter
contumaciam haberi pro confesso ... Et hoc verum est. Debet ergo index facere quod
de crimine constet.
230. Joannes Andreae, Additio ad Speculum iudiciale, rubric De contumacia accusati
v. cognitas: Potestas contra ilium contumacem tulit sententiam ad capitis truncationem,
vel ut deberet furcis suspendi ita quod moreretur, habendo et condemnando ipsum
pro confesso de illo crimine. Ille postea capitur. Adversarius petit executionem sen-
tentie... Captus allegans quod ultra relegationem non debuit puniri propter contu-
maciam dicit quod suam innocentiam vult probare... Item licet cause prosecutio vel
facti questio in potestate sit iudicantis, pene tamen impositio reservatur auctoritate
legis... Solvit, ut supra dixi eum de iure audiendum [esse] per leges hic allegatas, licet
italica consuetudo servet contrarium.
231. Bonifacius de Vitalinis de Mantua, Tractatus de maleficiis (Lugduni, 1555),
proemium: nec presumant iudicare secundum eorum conscientias, ut faciunt multi
iuris et iustitie ignari, sed solum secundum leges et iura, et probationes sibi factas. For
the correct authorship and date of this tractatus, see D. Maffei, "Intorno a Bonifacio
Ammanati giurista e cardinale" 586 C.N.R.S. Colloques internationaux (Paris, 1980),
241.
232. Bartolus, In ius universum civile commentaria, Dig. 48.5.2.5.:... et sic iudex
inquirendo habet magis largas habenas quam credatis.
233. Ibid., Dig. 48.18.10 § Plurimum: De hoc [scilicet fama] fecit unum tractatum
in quo dixit modicum et bonum quidam qui est vocatus dominus Thomas de Piperata
de Bononia, et ubicumque ipse aliquid dicit, ego dicam vobis. Speculator etiam in
titulo de notoriis criminibus etiam ponit de fama et modicum et non clare.
234. Ibid., Dig. 12.3.31: Pro cuius declaratione primo oportet me dicere quando
dicatur plene probatum. Respondendum breviter quando est facta iudici plena fides,
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hoc est quando iudex per ea que sunt sibi ostensa est adductus ad fidem et credulitatem
eius quod intenditur.
235. Ibid.: ... ista scientia habetur duobus modis, uno modo, in rebus que sunt
artis seu scientie alicuius, per rationes et demonstrationes... Secundo modo ista
scientia habetur, in his que sunt facti, et tunc illud scire dicimur ad quod movetur per
sensum, hoc est scientia, qua requiritur in teste.
236. Ibid.: Ad hanc autem scientiam iudex non posset perduci in his que habent
actum transeuntem, sed bene posset perduci in his que sunt actus permanentis. Et
inter ista duo extrema, scilicet nescientiam et scientiam, est quoddam medium, videlicet
credulitas sive fides.
237. Ibid.: Ad istam autem credulitatem sive fidem pervenitur per quattuor gradus.
Primo cum iudici res proponitur per actorem et per reum negatur, tunc iudex adducitur
in dubitationem. Est enim dubitare quando quis non applicat magis animum suum ad
unam partern quam ad aliam... Ista dubitatio non est gradus probationis... Post
dubitationem autem potest iudex inclinare animum suum ad aliquam partium, et tunc
si hoc facit ex aliquo levi indicio vel ex aliquo levi argumento, ista appellatur suspicio,
que aliqualiter movet animum iudicis, non tamen in totum removet dubitati-
onem. .. Sed nec debet de suspicionibus aliquem damnari, et hic est primus gradus
probationis seu credulitatis... Post istam autem suspicionem si iudici apparent argu-
menta fortiora, tunc iudex incipit opinari... Et hic est secundus gradus proba-
tionis... Post istam opinionem, si iudici appareat tantum quod firmiter adhereat uni
parti absque aliquo dubio alicuius contrarii, tunc dicitur perfecta credulitas seu perfecta
probatio.
238. Ibid., Dig. 22.5.3 v. Testibus: Nota quod potestati iudicis conceditur utrum
debeat adhiberi fidis testi vel non. Tamen quia acta quandoque sunt examinanda in
causa appellationis, tutius est quod causa suspicionis propter quam fides testi minuitur
iudex faciat apparere in actis.
239. Ibid., Dig. 48.18.20: Ideo dico hic, quod sunt quidam iudices stulti qui statim
cum habent indicia contra reum, cogunt istum ad confitendum... Certe hoc non debet
fieri, quia condemnarent eum ex indiciis et suspicionibus, sed debent adhibere tormenta
cum moderamine et ex istis veritatem investigare. Et ita iam feci pluries, sed si habita
tortura non inveniebatur verum, absolvebam eum, et hoc faciebam scribi in actis,
"Habita tortura cum moderamine non reperi eum culpabilem." Et hoc ne tempore
syndicatus possit dici, "Tu debuisti eum torquere.:
240. Ibid., Dig. 12.2.31 no. 48: Istis premissis quero utrum due semiplene probationes
faciant unam plenam probationem? Et siquidem sunt due semiplene eiusdem generis,
ut duo testes, non est dubium quod faciant plenam, sed si sunt due semiplene diversi
generis, tunc videtur quod non faciant plenam.
241. Ibid., Dig. 47.2.3: Idem dico, si aliquis deprehenditur in domo alicuius, ubi
pulchra mulier est, certe facit hunc adulterum manifestum; Ibid., Dig. 48.5.2 v. Si
simul Quero qualiter probabitur adulterium? Responsum non potest probari directo
aliqua ratione, quia si videres in camera duos vel in lecto, nescires tamen quid facerent.
Sed dico quod probatur ex presumptione.
242. Ibid., Cod. 4.19.25: In criminalibus exiguntur probationes luce clariores. Facit
iste textus... quod maleficia possunt probari per instrumenta... Et videtur quod quis
condemnetur ex presumptionibus, ut I. Si quis adulterii, de adulterio. Dicit glossa
quod hic fallit. Tu dic quod indicium facit probationem luce clariorem, quia iudicem
reddit certum de adulterio.
243. Ibid., Dig. 1.18.6.1: Allegatur quod iudex debet iudicare secundum allegata et
probata, non autem secundum conscientiam... Solutio: Aut id quod iudex habet in
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conscientia est notum sibi ut iudici aut tanquam private persone. Primo casu conscientia
sua iudicat informatus ex actis coram eo, et ita potest intelligi hic. Alias, si ut private
persone est sibi notum, tunc non potest iudicare secundum conscientiam suam, sed
secundum probationes sibi factas.
Bartolus interpreted this famous maxim as an exclusionary principle concerning
evidence, rather than as a constraint upon the judge's exercise of discretionary power
to determine guilt or innocence according to a standard of subjective certainty.
244. Ibid., Dig. 48.18.20 no. 6: Non insisto sed quero utrum requirantur plura
indicia an sufficiat unum indicium ad torturam? Leges omnes videntur loqui in
plurale... Glossa videtur loqui in singulari... Hoc stat in arbitrio iudicis.
245. Ibid., no. 5: De hoc non potest dari certa doctrina, sed relinquitur arbitrio
iudicis... Sed ego dabo doctrinam quam potero, et pone in terminis, aliquis accusatur
de furto; contra eum possunt esse indicia, quod est homo male conditionis et fame, et
consuetus facere similia... quod ipse erat vicinus, habebat notam domum. Nam quia
conversabatur ibi ... et quod ipse post furtum factum aufugit et se abscondit... et
post furtum repertus est expendere pecuniam cum ante esset pauper homo, et nec
reperitur unde habeat... Item quod res furtiva est reperta penes cum...
246. Ibid., Dig. 48.18.20: Iste tamen presumptiones... possunt elidi, verbi gratia,
si res furtiva reperiatur penes me, ostendo eum a quo habui.
247. Ibid., Dig. 48.19.5: Hic habetis quod nemo debet damnari ex suspitionibus et
presumptionibus.
248. Ibid., no. 1: Dicitur hic quod in criminibus non potest damnari absens. Quero
utrum hoc verum sit, sive sit absens post litem contestatam, sive ante? Quidam dicunt
post litis contestationem posset damnari quis ... Azo et Hug. dicunt indistincte
absentem non damnandum.
249. Bartolus was aware that Cod. 9.47.21 was an ancient Roman law exception to
the general rule of Dig. 48.19.5. See ibid., Cod. 9.47.21 v. Ne diu: Hec lex ponit unum
casum in quo contra absentes pervenitur ad condemnationem in crimine capitali. But
the quasi-capital sentence of the criminal ban was interpreted as a less-than-capital
punishment, equivalent to the Roman relegatio. Even under the rule of Dig. 48.19.5,
an absent party could be sentenced to exile. Cf. Bartolus's comments at Dig. 48.1.10.
250. Ibid., Dig. 48.8.1.1: Domini quicquid ipsi dicant, veritas est ista: per italiam
maleficia puniuntur secundum statuta, non secundum leges.
251. Ibid., Dig. 48.16.6 no. 3: Quero que dicantur crimina notoria? Tractatum de
notoriis criminibus non habemus in iure nostro, sed canonistes habent tractatum
longum.
252. Ibid.: Tamen quantum ad propositum nostrum ... notorium dicitur proprie
illud quod habet causam permanentem. Illud vero quod habet causam momentaneam
dicitur magis manifestum quam notorium.
253. Ibid., Dig. 11.7.4 no. 2: Sed quid arbitrabitur iudex? Dicas quod verum
notorium est quando factum est tale de sua natura quod omnes sciunt vel scire eos
verisimile sit, sic quod non possit allegare ignorantiam, quin sit supina, sicut si quis
gerat se pro episcopo in aliqua civitate, vel si quis in veritate toto populo aspiciente
occidit hominem.
254. Notorium, properly understood, meant a crime that was so well established
that no formal trial was required. The summary procedure for crimen notorium was a
product of canon law; cf. X.3.2.8. Manifestum was easily confused with notorium. Cf.
Bartolus at Dig. 11.7.4: Quandoque tamen manifestum ponitur pro notorio... Unde
ubi manifestum scribitur in aliqua materia que non requirat iudicialem indaginem nec
probationem, propter quod exponitur manifestum, id est notorium, alioquin impropria
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significatione reiecta, verba secundum subiectam materiam intelligun-
tur.... Manifestum was as old as the Twelve Tables, the earliest redaction of republican
Roman law, and served to increase the sentence for theft four-fold. Cf. A. Berger,
Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (1953) s.v. "furtum manifestum."
255. Bartolus, In ius universum civile commentaria, Dig. 47.2.3: Ita vides hic si
deprehenditur quis cum re furtiva, licet non fuerit visus furari, est manifestus fur. But
he could still disprove his guilt, ibid., Dig. 48.18.20.
256. Ibid., Dig. 12.2.31.
257. Ibid., Dig. 47.2.3 no. 48: Item si aliquis fucrit visus effugere cum gladio
evaginato et reperitur aliquis mortuus, certe ex hoc est homicidium manifestum, quod
talis fecit.
258. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus defama, text at n.132.
259. This reading of the procedure in a case of "manifest homicide" would be
consistent with Bartolus's discussion of presumptive proof based upon "special indicia;'
In ius universum civile commentaria, Dig. 48.18.20, where Bartolus seems to suggest
that even evidence that would constitute a manifest theft retains the limited character
of a rebuttable presumption: Ista tamen presumptiones... possunt elidi.
260. Ibid., Dig. 48.5.25 suggests that the inquisitorial judge received his power from
the ius commune and from statutory law: Et sic iudex inquirendo habet magis largas
habenas quam credatis; et hoc de iure commune, sed de iure municipali in quibusdam
terris sunt statuta quod indistincte iudex posset inquirere.
261. On Angelus, see T. Diplovatatius, De claris iuris consultis, 374, and Clarence-
Smith, Medieval Law Teachers § 132.
Angelus Aretinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric Comparuerunt dicti inquisiti, no.
5: Et quod dixi, quod ex indiciis nemo potest damnari, verum est nisi indicia sunt
indubitata.
262. Ibid., rubric Quodfama publica procedente, no. 8: Indicium vero plenum est
dinumeratio rei per signa sufficientia, per que animus in aliquo tamquam existente
quiescit et plus investigare non curat.
263. Ibid., no. 18. Angelus quoted Thomas's case verbatim, but with attribution.
For the text, see n. 132.
264. Ibid., rubric Comparuerunt dicti inquisiti, no. 5: Et dicuntur indicia indubitata
secundum Ni. de Ma., Bal., et Sal.... quando a lege sunt approbata adeo quod lex
vult super illa indicia fieri condemnationem... quia cum ista sint legi indubitata,
debent etiam esse iudici indubitata.
265. Ibid.: Secus si a lege non sunt approbata, sed iudicis religioni commissa sunt,
quia ix illis solis non potest damnari, ut dicta lege Absentem (Dig. 48.19.5).
266. Ibid.: Et ponunt exemplum in indiciis indubitatis ubicumque ex qualitate et
indiciorum multitudine indicatur veritas oculis mentis iudicis, sicut clara lux veritatem
ostendit oculis corporis.
267. Cod. 4.19.25. It may be worth noting that this snippet of Roman law, which
was probably the most frequently cited authority for the proposition that criminal
proofs must be "clearer than light" in fact laid out three alternative forms of proof in
criminal cases: reputable witnesses, irrefutable documents, or indicia "clearer than
light" that are "undoubted as to proof." Hence the original formulation of the standard
of proof "clearer than the light of day" was specifically tied to circumstantial evidence,
and not to witness proof
268. Angelus Aretinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, rubric Comparuerunt dicti inquisiti,
no. 5: Quidam visus est intrare domum Titii cum gladio; postea auditus est Titius
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acclamasse; postea ille cum gladio sanguinolento visus est exire domum, et Titius
reperitur in facie vulneratus.
269. Ibid.: Tunc ista sunt signa et indicia indubitata simul collecta, et ex his potest
ille condemnari de vulnere.
270. Ibid.: Et hoc videtur determinasse Bartolus in similibus exemplis in lege
secunda, ff. de furtis. (Dig. 47.2.2).
271. What Angelus seems to have had in mind was Bartolus's commentary at Dig.
47.2.3, text at nn. 241, 255. But elsewhere, at Dig. 11.7.4, Bartolus had been very
careful to distinguish between the "manifest" cases illustrated by his examples in the
commentary to Dig. 47.2.3, and other cases that were either "notorious" (Dig. 11.4.7)
or "fully proved" by establishing undoubted belief in the mind of the judge (Dig.
12.2.31).
272. Augustinus Giganticus, Commentaria, rubric Comparuerunt dicti inquisiti, no.
5.
273. In contrast to Girolamo Giganti's impatient slap at Angelus Aretinus for having
quoted Thomas's opinion about proof by undoubted indicia, see Jacobus de Bellovisu,
Practica iudiciaria, rubric De questionibus et qualitate tormentorum, nos. 78-81, arguing
that in many cases the law permits criminal cases to be determined by arguments and
presumptions. This point was illustrated by three cases-the room with one exit, the
body in the vineyard, and the assassination of Titius. Each of the hypotheticals is
phrased in terms quoted from Thomas de Piperata's Tractatus defama. The Practica
iudiciaria, or Practica criminalia, universally attributed to Jacobus de Bellovisu, was
actually an early sixteenth-century work whose publisher attributed it to a famous
fourteenth-century jurist in order to enhance the work's credibility and circulation. See
D. Maffei, "Giuristi medievali e falsificazione editoriale......Jlus commune, Sonderheft
10 (1979).
274. This is not to suggest that Thomas made a brilliant conceptual leap. He
articulated expressly a theme that was implied in Roman law texts such as Cod. 4.19.25
and Dig. 22.5.3.
275. Langein, Torture and the Law of Proof 3-8; Fiorelli, La tortura giudiziaria.
276. Ibid.
277. Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof 5-8.
278. Ibid., 6.
279. B. Shapiro, "To a Moral Certainty: Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American
Juries 1600-1850,' Hastings Law Journal 38:155.
280. Donahue, "Proof by Witnesses in the Church Courts of Medieval England;'
133.
281. N6rr, Zur Stellung des Richters.
282. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus defama.
283. X.2.1.2.
284. Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof, 5-8; Fraher, "Preventing Crime in
the High Middle Ages;' n.17.
285. Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water, 70-83 gives a good, short account of the
evidence suggesting that people suspected that ordeals could be brought to a crooked
result. Bartlett himself thinks that theological and legal considerations were more
important than social, practical concerns.
286. For the Aristotelian impact on doctrinal and intellectual developments in the
university curriculum during the 1200s, see G. Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities in
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: An Institutional and Intellectual History (1975)
185-238; for the Aristotelian impact on political thought, a useful introduction is W.
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Ullmann, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages (1975) Ch. 8, "The New Science of
Politics."
287. See especially Aquinas's Summa theologica, the first part of the second part,
questions 90 to 97, on the nature and effects of law. Available in an English translation
in D. Bigongiari, ed. The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas (1953) 3-85.
288. For Bernard's world, the best introduction is J. Leclerq, The Love of Learning
and the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture (1961).
289. Statuti di Bologna, Bk. 1, rubric 5; Statuti del Capitano del Popolo, Bk. 2,
rubrics 1, 2, and 28. Texts at n. 113.
290. Thomas de Piperata, Quaestio disputata. Incipit: Cavetur in statuto civitatis
Bononie quod potestas habeat arbitrium in homicidiis suo tempore perpetratis. Text
preserved in Arch. S. Pietro, MS A.29 fol. 99v. Publica utilitas est quod presens potestas
habeat arbitrium in dicto maleficio, ut sic puniatur. Nam rei publice interest mala
puniri.
291. For a general discussion, see G. D'Amelio et al., Studi sulle "Quaestiones,'
222-96. The two quaestiones at issue are the one mentioned supra in n.290, which is
preserved only in manuscript form, and another, partially printed in ibid., 248, incipit:
Statutum est in civitate Bononie si quis fuerit accusatus...
292. Ibid., 248-50.
293. MS Arch. S. Pietro A.29 fol. 99r: Solutio: Dico dictos fideiussores non teneri
ad dictam condemnationem solvendam... quia omnino separata sunt et diversa
maleficium vel malefactor et fideiussor vel contractus, unde obligatio fideiussoris non
est pars cause maleficii.
294. Ibid.: Tertium [argumentum] est arbitrii supradicti iniquitas. Nam talia arbitria
conceduntur potestatibus contra ius commune, et ideo extendi non debent.
295. Ibid.: Item (arbitria] sunt odiosa. Nam plerumque potestas ex arbitrio condem-
nat absolvendum et absolvit condemnandum, et ideo debent restringi.
296. Thomas de Piperata, Quaestio disputata, text at n.290.
297. MS Arch S. Pietro A.29 fol. 99v: Contingit quod tempore preterite potestatis
fuit quidam vulneratus. Moritur ex illo vulnere tempore presentis. Queritur numquid
presens potestas habeat arbitrium in hoc homicidio, an non?
298. Ibid., Solutio: Dico preteritam potestatem non habuisse arbitrium nec presentem
habere in dicto maleficio sive homicidio.
299. Ibid.: Preteritam potestatem dico non habuisse arbitrium in dicto malo sive
homicidio, quia dictum malum fuit suo tempore inchoatum, set non fuit suo tempore
consummatum, et dicto "perpetratis" requirit veram consummationem homicidii
factam in suo tempore.
300. Ibid.: Set inchoatum alteris tempore fuit suo tempore consummatum. Ubi
enim potestas habeat arbitrium in homicidiis, obtinet quod certo tempore, scilicet
tempore sue regiminis sint totali perpetrata inchoando et consummendo. Verbum enim
"perpetratis" designat rem perfectam.
301. Ibid.: Sexta quia publica utilitas est quod presens potestas habeat arbitrium in
dicto maleficio, ut sic puniatur. Nam rei publice interest mala punire.
Cf. Fraher, "The Theoretical Justification for the New Criminal Law of the High
Middle Ages.'
302. Dig. 9.2.51. I suggest that Thomas must have known the text because it was
a stock authority for one of his favorite themes, the public interest in criminal
prosecutions.
303. Ibid.: "A slave who had been wounded so gravely that he was certain to die
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of the injury was appointed someone's heir and subsequently killed by a further blow
from another assailant?'
304. Ibid.: "But if anyone should think that we have reached an absurd conclusion,
let him ponder carefully how much more absurd it would be to conclude that neither
should be liable under the lex Aquilia or that one should be blamed rather than the
other?'
305. On "free rein,' see Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama, text at n. 118;
Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, text at n.181; Bartolus, In ius universum civile
commentaria, text at n.232.
306. MS Arch. S. Pietro A. 29 fol. 99r., text at n.295.
307. Blanshei, "Criminal Law and Politics of Medieval Bologna?'
308. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama, text at n. 124.
309. Ibid., text at n.122.
310. This is true if fama, the procedural prerequisite to an inquisitio, played a role
analogous to that of probable cause.
311. This was the rule of Dig. 48.19.5, at least in capital cases.
312. Thomas de Piperata, Tractatus de fama, text at n. 124.
313. The most recent expression of the same conflict in our own criminal process
is McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S.Ct. 1756 (1987).
314. Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water, 70.
315. Hyams, "Trial by Ordeal,' 125.
316. A. Watson, The Evolution of Law (1985). Watson believes that where a
professional class of lawyers emerges in a society, the lawyers' traditions and professional
concerns dominate other factors in the development of the law, particularly in private
law. Social needs and functions then affect the evolution of the legal system less directly
than in the earliest stages of legal development, before the emergence of a professional
class of jurists.
